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The Treaty of Rome,' signed on March 25, 1957, created the European
Economic Community (EEC), an entity whose purpose was the promo-
tion of economic unity among the six member nations2 through the
elimination of customs duties between states, unification of external
tariffs, provisions for free movement of labor, capital, and services, and
the elimination of competitive distortion.3 The ultimate goal was the
achievement of an economic unit over a transitional period of twelve
years,4 during which time disparity among national laws affecting trade
and commerce would be reduced through a program of "approxima-
tion."5 The EEC Council6 is empowered, on recommendation by the
Commission,7 to issue directives, binding on member states, which will
* Member of the Georgia Bar. A.B. 1970, Wellesley College; J.D. 1975, Emory Univer-
sity.
The author is very grateful to William C. Bowers for assistance in the preparation of
this article.
1. 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958). The authentic English text of the Treaty can be found at 1
CCH ComM. MKT. REP. 151 (1973).
2. Art. 2, 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 165 (1973).
3. Art. 3, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 171 (1973).
4. Art. 8, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 195 (1973).
5. Art. 100, 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 3302 (1975). See E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF
EUROPEAN COMPANY LAws; NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION, 9-11, 49-
51 (1971).
6. The Council is the EEC's decision-making body. Council members are high officials
of the ministries of their respective governments, charged with safeguarding their coun-
tries' national interests in Council deliberations. Important votes must be passed unani-
mously or by qualified majority, the votes being weighted in favor of the larger countries.
Costonis, The Treaty-Making Power of the European Economic Community: The
Perspective of a Decade, 5 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 421, 423 (1967). See 1 CCH COMm. MKT.
REP. 1 4405-06 (1975).
7. The Commission is a general executive and administrative body of thirteen members
appointed by mutual agreement among the member states. They must exercise their
duties in a manner independent of national interest. See 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 4471
(1975).
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prescribe unified ends to be reached, leaving the choice of means to the
individual national governments.'
Articles 52-58 of the Treaty form the basis for a section on the "Right
of Establishment," which can be broadly defined as the "right to carry
on a non-wage-earning activity in Community countries other than
one's own without discrimination on grounds of nationality."9 This right
is consistent with the policies of free movement of goods and services,
requiring that the nationals of each Member State receive national
treatment in each of the other Member States in regard to commercial
endeavors.'" Central to the concept is Article 54, which directs the for-
mation of a program for elimination of restrictions on freedom of estab-
lishment. This program was adopted in December, 1961," setting forth
a timetable for the elimination of specific restrictions on establishment.
The Council and Commission were specifically directed under Article
54(3) to see that national laws and administrative procedures and prac-
tices were coordinated quickly, especially in high priority areas such as
removal of restrictions on the ability of Member nationals to acquire
property in Member States. Article 54(3)(g), the central subsection for
purposes of this discussion, authorizes the Council and Commission to
assure the coordination of national laws to the extent necessary to pro-
tect the interests of shareholders and creditors of companies or firms
organized under laws of the Member States."
Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has between 1967 and
1972 submitted six directives concerning company law to the Council.'3
Only the first directive has been issued by the Council,'4 since the en-
trance of Britain, Ireland and Denmark to the EEC under the Treaty of
Accession of January 31, 1972' 5 resulted in substantial adjustments in
the community institutions." Some aspects of the directives have be-
8. Art. 189, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 4901-02 (1971). Directives are distinguished
from "regulations" and "decisions." Regulations are binding in every respect on parties
to whom they apply. See generally STEIN, supra note 5, at 49-51.
9. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 1302 (1973).
10. Reyners v. Belgian State, 14 COMM. MKT. L. REP. 305, 309 (1974).
11. STEIN. supra note 5, at 25.
12. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 1331 (1973).
13. For text of the directives, see 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1356-1405Z (1974-1976).
The areas treated by the directives are (1) disclosure, (2) capitalization, (3) mergers, (4)
accounting methods, (5) company structure and power of various organs and (6) prospec-
tuses. Citations to the directives will be to CCH COMM. MKT. REP. which contains the
complete text of all six directives with all amendments.
14. 11 E.E.C. J.O. L65 (1968).
15. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 7011-7351 (1973).
16. For changes resulting in the Community institutions under the Treaty of Accession,
see 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 7047-7053 (1973). Of major concern was the reapportion-
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come more controversial with British entry because of major national
differences in company structure and shareholder protection."
This Article will consider the Second" and Fifth Proposed Directives'9
as they relate to the national company laws of Britain,20 France,2 ' and
the Federal Republic of Germany.22 American company law, as repre-
ing of delegate votes in the Assembly and assigning weighted votes to the new members
in the Council and the Commission.
17. See Dalton, Proposals for the Unification of Corporation Law Within the European
Economic Community: Effect on the British Company, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 59
(1974). Under the British Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 1-462
thereinafter Act of 1948], British firms are structured as are American firms, with a
Board of Directors responsible for company policy and major decisions and officers con-
trolling day to day operations. Id. §§ 176-204. In German firms, on the contrary, a Man-
agement Board (Vorstand) is responsible for day to day operations as well as policy
questions. The Management Board is appointed by a Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat),
elected two-thirds by the shareholders and one-third by labor representatives. The Super-
visory Board is not directly involved in management but must approve the company's
financial statements and serves in a "watchdog" capacity. German Stock Corporation Act
(Aktiengesetz), Law of September 6, 1965, [1965] BGBI.I 1089 §§ 76-116, effective Jan.
1, 1966. [Hereinafter AktG]. English translation in GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (F.
Juenger & L. Schmidt transl. 1967). Steefel & von Falkenhausen, The New German Stock
Corporation Law, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1967); Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corpora-
tion: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23, 50 (1966).
18. 13 E.E.C. J.O. C4818 (1970); 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 1371 (1973). For a brief
discussion of the Second Directive see Lang, Three EEC Draft Directives on Company
Law - Capital, Mergers and Management, 7 IR. JUR. 306, 307-13 (1972).
19. 15 E.E.C. J.0. C131/149 (1972); 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1401 (1974). For a brief
discussion of the Fifth Directive see Lang, supra note 18, at 319-26.
20. Act of 1948 and Companies Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 81 [hereinafter Act of
19671. The Act of 1967 was passed to give added protection to shareholders through
strengthened audit requirements (§§ 3-14), expanded directors' report requirements (§§
15-24), and provision of penalties for dealing by directors and their families in company
share options (§§ 25-32). The Act also strengthened the power of the Board of Trade to
bring civil proceedings in behalf of the company (§§ 35-42).
21. The French Law on Commercial Companies, Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, J.O.
of July 26, 1966, (English Translation in FRENCH LAW ON COMMERCIAL COMPANIES (CCH
transl. 1971)) was drawn to consolidate the law for all the forms of business association
(general and limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and Societes Anonymos or
Stock Companies) and to increase shareholder and third party protection. The drafters
were mindful of the move toward European unity and borrowed heavily from the German
Act, especially in the area of corporate structure. A French S.A. may choose either the
traditional form of the Administrative Board or the German two-tiered structure. FRENCH
LAW ON COMMERCIAL COMPANIES, supra at 1-7.
22. The primary impetus for the 1965 Act was increased shareholder protection. Be-
cause bearer shares are the norm in Germany banks have a great deal of control at
shareholder meetings. See Roth, Supervision of Corporate Management: The "Outside"
Director and the German Experience, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1369, 1379 (1973). Under the new
Act, banks must give shareholders an opportunity to instruct them on voting proxies and
are accountable to the shareholders for their votes. Further, the Act strengthens the
1976]
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sented by the Delaware Corporations Code3 and the ABA-ALI Model
Business Corporations Act, will be compared where pertinent. The
Sanders Draft Statute for a European Stock Corporation" as modified
by the Draft Statute for a European Company2 submitted to the EEC
Council by the Commission will also be considered. Attention will be
focused on four aspects of shareholder protection: (1) capitalization; (2)
corporate decision-making; (3) the shareholder's relationship with man-
agement; and (4) the auditor's responsibility to the shareholder.
I
THE SHAREHOLDER AND HIS CAPITAL
The corporate investor usually purchases an interest in a company
with the expectation that his capital will be used toward the generation
of profit by the corporation, earning dividends for him, and thereby
maximizing the economic value of his shares. His practical expectations
are that the company will be adequately capitalized, that he will have
an opportunity to maintain his percentage of ownership in the company,
that the capital will not be reduced and dissipated without his consent,
and that dividends will not be unreasonably withheld. This first section
will consider the extent to which his expectations are fulfilled under the
various statutes in question.
shareholder's right to obtain information at meetings and lowers barriers to legal remedies.
AktG, f 1965] BGB1.I 1084, supra note 17, at 19-21. See notes 164-77 infra and accompa-
nying text.
23. Din.. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (Supp. 1968).
24. P. SANDERS. EUROPEAN STOCK CORPORATION TEXT OF DRAFT STATUTE (CCH 1969).
Citations will be to this draft except where amended in its implementation.
25. 13 E.E.C. J.O. C124 (1970). A European Company was first proposed in France in
1959. The same year, it was presented in an address by Professor Pieter Sanders, and in
1960 the EEC Commission studied the idea but found it unworkable because of industrial
antipathy. In 1965, however, the European Company was seen by the French as a vehicle
for increasing concentration of industry within the Common Market, stimulating growth
and prosperity and limiting American investment. Professor Sanders was invited by the
EEC Commission to prepare a draft statute which was completed in 1967. The Commis-
sion's statute leaves Sanders' draft substantially intact and adds sections on taxation and
penal provisions. Norton, A Cheshire Cat Affair: The European-Type Company and Its
Meaning for the American Enterprise in the European Community, 6 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
111, 112-20 (1973). See generally Leleux, Corporation Law in the United States and in the
EEC: Some Comments on the Present Situation and Future Prospects, 5 COMM. MKT. L.
REv. 133 (1968); Mann, The European Company, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 468 (1970);
Sanders, The European Company on Its Way, 8 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 29 (1971); Scholten,
The European Company, 5 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 9 (1968); Storm, A New Impulse Towards
a European Company, 26 Bus. LAW. 1443 (1971); Van Gerven, Some Recent Developments
in Corporate Law Within the Common Market, 6 INT. LAW. 494 (1972).
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A. MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
While the primary purpose of a stated capital requirement is the
protection of creditors, the shareholder also has an interest in having the
corporation adequately funded. 6 The shareholder invests in the com-
pany with the expectation that the business will be profitable; therefore,
failure on the part of incorporators to anticipate the extent of start-up
expenses or first-year losses and to capitalize accordingly represents a
substantial threat of complete loss to the shareholder.27 Moreover, egre-
gious cases of under-capitalization may justify piercing the corporate
veil to hold shareholders themselves personally liable in contract or tort
actions by third parties.
28
Though American and British corporation laws effectively require no
minimum capital,29 the French and German Acts require substantial
minimum subscriptions." The Second Directive prescribes that each
company shall be formed with no less than 25,000 units of account (the
equivalent of American dollars).31 The Draft Statute for a European
26. Note, The Inadequacy of Stated Capital Requirements, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 823, 826
(1971).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 364 P.2d 473 (1961);
Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
29. Since the disappearance of the "trust fund" theory, stated capital requirements
have lost much of their effectiveness:
Many modem corporation statutes, particularly those patterned after the Model
Business Corporation Act, require only a $500 or $1,000 commitment to stated
capital. This is a trifling sum even for the smallest of corporations and hardly
represents an adequate safeguard for the protection of creditors.
Note, The Inadequacy of Stated Capital Requirements, supra note 26, at 829.
30. AktG, [19651 BGBI.I 1089 § 7, requires a stock company to have subscriptions of
100,000 DM (about $25,000). The French Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, § 71
requires minimum subscription of 500,000 francs ($90,000) for an S.A. These high capitali-
zation requirements are in part responsible for a significant difference in American and
European company law. While in America the close corporation has developed under the
same statutes as the public corporation, in Europe incorporators may choose between the
limited liability company and the stock company. A limited liability company is called a
private company in Britain, a Societe a Responsabilite Limite (SARL) in France, and a
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH) in Germany. This form of doing business
is extremely popular in France and Germany because, besides the lesser capital require-
ments, the disclosure provisions for these organizations are far less stringent than for stock
companies. Limits are placed on the number of members in a GmbH or SARL and
interests are transferable only through a complicated notarial process in Germany and on
approval of other company members in France. Similar provisions apply to the private
company in Britain. See CCH Doiwe BUSINESS IN EUROPE, 22,715, 23,206, 23,276, 23,705
(1972-1974); STEIN, supra note 5, at 237-58; de Vries and Juenger, Limited Liability
Contract: The GmbH, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1964); Vagts, supra note 17, at 33-35.
31. Proposed Second Council Directive, Art. 6, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1371F (1974).
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Company presently requires that the minimum capital be 500,000 u.a.
for formation of a European Company through merger or joint establish-
ment of a holding company, 250,000 u.a. for transformation from a stock
company under national law to a European Company, and 100,000 u.a.
for formation of a joint or sole subsidiary.2 For all except the European
Company, the 25,000 u.a. proposal of the Second Directive seems ade-
quate. The purpose of requiring a minimum capital is to protect credi-
tors and shareholders. American and British corporation statutes as-
sume that stiff capital disclosure requirements serve as adequate protec-
tion for both groups.3 In combination with the disclosure requirements
of the First Directive, 3 the Second Directive's minimum of 25,000 u.a.
provides adequate shareholder and creditor protection from dissipation
of corporate assets and under-capitalization.
To ensure good-faith purchase of stock, the Second Directive man-
dates that, before a share is issued, it must be 25 percent paid up if
issued for cash and 100 percent paid up if issued for property or serv-
ices.3 5 This requirement is borrowed from the German 3 and French"
laws and is in sharp contrast to the British law at one extreme and the
European Company law at the other. In Britain, each shareholder's
required payment on purchase is five percent of market value with fur-
ther payments to be made when the company calls for them or upon
sale.3 1 In the European Company Statute, all shares, whether issued for
32. 13 E.E.C. J.O. C124/3, Art. 4. The Sanders Draft had required that these amounts
be 1,000,000 u.a., 500,000 u.a. and 250,000 u.a., respectively. Sanders Draft, supra note
24, Art. 1-3. The capital requirements for the European Stock Company have been set
unusually high not only to afford protection to shareholders but also to limit the availabil-
ity of the corporate form. The drafters were very sensitive to fears that the European
Company would prove so attractive that national corporations would convert to European
companies, depriving countries of revenue. See Dalton, supra note 19, at 69; Scholten,
supra note 29, at 14; Storm, Statute of a Societas Europaea, 5 CoMM. MKT. L. REV. 265,
269-71 (1968). Professor Storm proposes also that the European Company should be a
large unit by definition in order to compete with American multinationals in Europe. Id.
at 267-68.
33. In the United States, disclosure before issue is effected through the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970). In Britain, the prospectus must include statements
of both the authorized capital and the minimum allotment required before the company
may commence business. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 37-48 and Sched. 4.
34. Art. 2(e), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1357 (1974).
35. Art. 7, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1371G (1974).
36. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, §§ 27, 36. Where shares are issued for a premium, one-
fourth of the premium must also be paid before issuance.
37. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 75. The remaining three-fourths of
subscribed capital must be paid in within five years. Id. If the company is not organized
within six months from the date funds were first deposited, contributors may petition the
court for authorization to withdraw their contributions. Id. Art. 39.
38. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 47(3), (4).
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cash or in kind, must be fully paid up before issuance. 9 American corpo-
ration laws are generally silent as to minimum paid-in capital, but
shareholders are liable to the company for any portion of the price not
paid in.4" The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes margin require-
ments greater than 50 percent on purchasers of stock subject to SEC
control.4' The margin requirement is adequate for shares to which it
applies, but there is potential for abuse by American corporations issu-
ing shares not subject to SEC regulation.
An area in which American corporation law affords the shareholder
far less protection than the proposed EEC directive is the valuation of
non-cash assets. In Delaware and other states, stock may be issued for
labor done, personal property, real property or leases as well as cash with
the directors' judgment as to the value of the consideration being con-
clusive unless actual fraud can be demonstrated.42 The Second Direc-
tive, in contrast, requires that before any shares are issued for property
other than cash, such property must be evaluated by an independent
person appointed by an administrative or judicial authority. The ap-
pointees must report formally to the shareholders on the value of the
property and of the shares to be issued for it and the report must be
published in the national legal newspaper.43 This is similar to the prac-
tice in France and Germany. Under French law, a valuation by a court-
appointed appraiser must be appended to the by-laws. The valuation
must be available for examination by subscribers and is voted on at the
organizational meeting. Valuation may be reduced only by a unanimous
vote of all subscribers.4 To be valid in Germany, a contribution of assets
other than cash must be recorded in the articles with the name of the
donor and the par value of shares issued in return. The management
board, supervisory board, and auditors of the formation must include
examination of such transactions in a formation report to be made avail-
able to the court of the district, the managing board and the Chamber
of Industry and Commerce. Anyone may inspect the report at the court
or the Chamber of Industry.
4 5
39. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. II-1-5(3)(c).
40. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 156, 162 (1975).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1970).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Supp. 1975). See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 1109 (West
Supp. 1976); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 19 (1971). This lack of protection is
serious, however, only for shareholders in completely intrastate corporations where state
blue sky laws are weak, since the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5, 7 and Sched. A provides for
strict disclosure of value of assets other than cash to be received for shares. 15 U.S.C. §
77(e),(g),(aa) (1970).
43. Art. 8, 1 CCH CoNM. MKT. REP. 1371H (1974).
44. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 80.
45. AktG [1965] BGBI.I 1089, §§ 26, 27, 34.
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The Second Directive proposal seems superior because of the poten-
tial in the German system for coercion of auditors where a joint report
is submitted. The auditors should appraise independently and should
bear responsibility for the appraisals. This system is used in the Sanders
Draft, which requires that one or more auditors wholly independent46 of
the founding company file a report including a valuation of contribu-
tions in kind, the names of contributors, and the par value and class of
shares issued in return." The European Court of Justice will examine
every report, another manifestation of the high standards required for
the European Company.48
British law is heavily reliant on disclosure for the prevention of asset
overvaluation. The company prospectus must set forth for the preceding
two years, the number and amount of shares issued as fully or partly
paid up otherwise than in cash. It must also inclue the extent to which
shares are partly paid, the names and addresses of vendors and descrip-
tions of the property. 9 No formal appraisal is necessary. If the EEC
Council issues the Second Directive, British shareholders will have the
benefit of an independent appraisal included in the prospectus and will
be assured of fully paid-in contributions in kind. Considering the reluc-
tance of common-law judges to interfere in the internal affairs of corpo-
rations and impose liability on corporate directors," the continental
system of formal appraisal of assets by independent auditors appears to
afford shareholders superior protection against watered stock.
B. INCREASE OF CAPITAL
Because the issuance of an additional number of shares is prejudicial
to the central and financial status of shareholders, all of the laws under
consideration provide that shareholders must approve such issue. In
Delaware, a simple majority of the shareholders qualified to vote at a
meeting may amend the articles to increase the capital, but if any one
class of shares would be prejudiced by the increase, that class, whether
normally entitled to vote or not, must also approve the increase by a
46. The criteria to establish independence are to be taken from the French law of July
24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 220. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, 176 provides that
auditors may not be: (1) founding board members, contributors in kind or beneficiaries
of special preferences; (2) blood relatives and relatives by marriage to the fourth degree
of such persons; (3) board members or their spouses of companies owning one-tenth of a
corporation of whose capital the principal corporation owns one-tenth; (4) auditing firms
of which one of the members is in categories 1-3.
47. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. 11-1-4, 11-1-5.
48. Sanders Draft, id., Art. H-1-6.
49. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, Sched. 4, Part 1(8), (9).
50. See notes 265-70 infra and accompanying text.
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majority.5 ' The Delaware statute differs sharply from the European stat-
utes, excluding Britain, 2 in that the articles of incorporation may spec-
ify "authorized capital" in an amount much greater than the original
subscription; the directors may then independently issue new subscrip-
tions without consulting the shareholders until the authorized limit is
reached.Y
The Second Directive requires only that the general meeting rules in
each country be followed in approving a capital increase, and that share-
holders in classes specially affected must approve the increase by a
majority of those present.54 This provision is weak as it does not equalize
shareholder protection because the quorum and the majority provisions
vary widely." While the directives should not necessarily require all
EEC countries to change their laws to provide the most stringent protec-
tion possible, some form of common denominator should be found." A
one-half outstanding capital quorum requirement with a two-thirds vot-
ing majority would be reasonable.
Under the Sanders Draft, the French law and the Second Directive,
all previously subscribed shares must be fully paid-up before any in-
crease in capital is possible.- The German law provides that in general
51. DEr. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(1), (2) (1974).
52. See Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 45, 47.
53. DEr.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4) (1974). This section also gives directors authority
to establish new classes of shares with different powers, preferences and rights, up to the
authorized capital limit. It is possible, once the original subscription is taken in full, for
shareholders under the AktG to approve an authorization of up to 50 percent of the original
stated capital, to be taken over a period of five years. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 202(3).
A similar provision is found in the Second Directive. Art. 221(2), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
q 1371K (1974). The Sanders Draft adopts this but reduces the statutory period to three
years. Supra note 24, Art. 111-1-2(3). Where such authorization is given under the Sanders
Draft, stringent requirements are placed on the managing board to use it in good faith
and account for its use at each shareholders' meeting. Id. Art. 111-1-4.
54. Art. 22(1), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. % 1371X (1974).
55. While in Britain only a majority of a general meeting need approve a capital in-
crease, German law requires a three-fourths majority of the capital represented and re-
quires that any class of shares affected by the increase also pass the resolution by three-
fourths. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 61; AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 182(1),
(2). An extraordinary general shareholders' meeting is required for an increase in France;
at least one-half of the voting shares outstanding must be represented and the resolution
must pass by a two-thirds majority. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 153,
180. If the increase is to be effected by capitalizing reserves, profits, or subscription
premiums, however, the vote need be only a simple majority. Id. Art. 155, 180.
56. The Sanders Draft recommendations are predictably cautious and do incorporate
the most stringent requirements among the national laws; to increase capital a quorum
of shareholders representing no less than one-half the outstanding capital is required; the
resolution must pass by a three-fourths majority. Supra note 24, Arts. 111-1-3; VII-3.
57. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. 1I-1-1; Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966,
19761
Cornell International Law Journal
capital may not be increased while contributions on present stated capi-
tal may still be obtained, but this requirement is waived if such amounts
are relatively minor."
The form of protection offered shareholders against any dilution of
their voting power or control is the preemptive right. Before a new issue
may be offered to the public, shareholders must be given the opportun-
ity to acquire the offered shares on a pro-rata basis. 9 In American corpo-
rations, the preemptive right need not be offered when treasury shares
are sold, when shares are given in exchange for property, or when shares
are issued only up to the original authorized capital." With the single
exception of Britain,"' the statutes under consideration have provided
for a preemptive right.12 Under the Second Directive the right may be
waived by decision of a majority of the general meeting sufficient to
amend the articles, on consideration of a report from the directors de-
tailing reasons for the restriction and accounting for the proposed issue
price. 3 This is the same as the German statute4 and the Sanders Draft 5
although more stringent than the French law, which requires only a
simple majority.6 Adoption of the Second Directive would, therefore,
affect only the British statutes with the effect on actual practices being
minimal.
Art. 182; Second Directive, Art. 21, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1371W (1974). See STEIN,
supra note 5, at 325-37.
58. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 182(4).
59. See W. CARY, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1143 (4th ed. 1969) [hereinafter
CARY. CASES]; see generally Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe
to New Shares, 43 HARV. L. REV. 586 (1930).
60. Drinker, supra note 59, at 603-07.
61. Although the corporate charter often provides for some form of preemptive right,
"in the absence of express provision the only restraint on the directors is that entailed by
the rule that they must act as fiduciaries when issuing further capital." Gower, Some
Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1380
(1956). The current American trend is to make the preemptive right optional; in California
the preemptive right does not exist unless provided for in the corporation's articles. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1106 (West 1955). Accord, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (1974). The Illinois
Business Corporation Act, § 24, ILL. ANN. STAT. § 157.24 (Supp. 1975), provides that the
preemptive right may be limited or denied by the articles.
62. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 183; AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, §
186; 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1372(2), (3) (1974); Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art.
111-1-3. All four statutes provide that the preemptive right exists in proportion to existing
interests held and may not be eliminated by company articles.
63. Art. 25, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1372 (1974).
64. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 186(3).
65. Supra note 24, Art. 111-1-3(3).
66. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 186. Added protection is given the
French shareholder, however, in the provision that shares of persons who will receive new
shares may not be included in the quorum or the vote. Id.
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C. REDUCTION OF CAPITAL
In virtually every American jurisdiction, a corporation may voluntar-
ily impair its capital through reduction." The primary purposes of capi-
tal reduction are to distribute assets to shareholders, to remedy an exist-
ing deficit, to write down asset overvaluations, to reduce the basis for
state franchise taxes, and to buy out dissident shareholders."5 Reduction
is much more carefully controlled than increase because of the many
opportunities it presents for abuse.69 Because of the risks involved, most
state statutes require a resolution by the board of directors to be ap-
proved by a majority of shareholders at a meeting, with notice. Capital
may not be reduced unless the remaining assets are sufficient to pay the
corporation's debts. A certificate authenticating adoption of the resolu-
tion and stating the extent to which capital is to be reduced must be
filed with the Secretary of State, and state approval of the reduction
must often be obtained. 0 The most effective limitations placed on re-
duction are those controlling distribution of assets released.71
In all the European statutes under consideration a proposal to reduce
capital must pass by a majority equivalent to that required to amend
the articles." The Second Directive contains a special provision that in
any capital reduction all shareholders must be treated equally and, if
the transaction may be detrimental to shareholders of any class (where
67. Note, The Current Law Regarding Reduction of Capital: Its Methodology, Purposes
and Dangers, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 723 (1962). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 244 (1974), which
lists four methods of reducing capital.
68. Note, The Current Law, supra note 67, at 724.
69. Id. Reduction may serve as a method for avoiding normally rigorous restrictions on
payment of dividends; it may also be used to disguise losses resulting from mismanage-
ment. Id. at 725.
70. Id. at 728-29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 244(b) (1974).
71. Note, The Current Law, supra note 67 at 731.
72. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 215 (extraordinary general share-
holders' meeting); AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, §§ 179, 222; Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6,
c. 38, §§ 10, 66 (special resolution); Second Directive, Art. 27, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
1372B (1974); Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. 111-1-5.
Some variation exists among the European statutes in techniques for achieving reduc-
tion. The Sanders Draft allows reduction only through lowering of par. Id. Art. 111-1-5(2).
The German Act allows reduction through lowering of par or consolidation to the extent
that the minimum par value cannot be maintained. AktG, [1965]BGB1.I 1089, § 222. A
British company may reduce capital by (1) extinguishing liability on any shares not yet
paid up, (2) canceling any paid-up share capital which is lost or unrepresented by
available assets, (3) paying off any paid-up share capital in excess of the company's needs,
or (4) lowering par. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 66. Since the Second Directive is
silent as to methods of reducing par, its passage would require no change in present laws;
an argument can be made that reduction should be limited to lowering par, since the
British system is open to abuse through discretionary paying up or retirement of shares.
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several categories of shares exist), each class must approve the resolu-
tion separately. 3 Adoption of the Directive would require an amend-
ment to this effect in each country, since, though solicitous of creditors
with claims antedating reduction, 74 the present statutes make no provi-
sion for minority share classes. 75 Such an amendment would clearly be
beneficial for the shareholders affected.
Closely interwoven with reduction of capital is the power of a com-
pany to purchase its own shares. This power has been used increasingly
since the 1960's in America as a vehicle for controlling the debt-equity
ratio, for stock option or other compensation plans, and for reduction
of the number of shares outstanding, thereby increasing earnings per
share .7 A company's purchase of its shares is highly susceptible to mis-
use, however, to the serious detriment of both shareholders and credi-
tors. The prevalent American view is that as long as only surplus is used
to purchase corporate shares, the position of shareholders and creditors
is not compromised. Use of capital is permitted in most statutes only
when shares are purchased (1) to eliminate fractional shares, (2) to
collect or compromise indebtedness to the corporation, (3) to buy out
dissenting shareholders under appraisal statutes, or (4) to effect the
retirement of shares.7 According to Professor Kessler, only the first and
73. Second Directive, Art. 34, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1372J (1974). The French Law
of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 215 also provides that equality of shareholders
must be maintained.
74. In Germany, creditors with antedating claims may request security within six
months of passage of the resolution. Payments to shareholders pursuant to reduction may
be made only after expiration of the six-month period. AktG, [1965]BGB1.I 1089, § 225.
The French Statute gives creditors one month to object, in district court, to the reduction.
The court may order payment of the debt or creation of guaranties; no steps may be taken
to reduce capital during the period allowed for objection. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of
July 26, 1966, Art. 216; Decree No. 267-236 of March 23, 1967, J.O. of March 24, 1967,
Art. 180 [hereinafter Decree of March 23, 1967]. Similarly, the Sanders Draft provides
that any creditors fearing that their rights are jeopardized may submit an appeal to the
European Court of Justice within two months of the filing of the minutes of the sharehold-
ers' meeting. If the appeal is justified, the Court will require appropriate guaranties before
forwarding the amended articles to the Commercial Registry. Supra note 24, Art. 111-1-6.
The British Act requires application to the court for an order confirming reduction. Credi-
tors may object to the reduction before such order is given, and the court will not confirm
the reduction until satisfied that creditors have consented to the reduction or have had
their claims discharged. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 66.
75. In Britain, the judge confirming the reduction may, in his discretion, alter the
voting powers of various classes but such provision is not required. 6 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENG.LAND 166 (3d ed. 1954) [hereinafter HALSBURY'S LAWS].
76. CARY. CASES, supra note 59, at 1591.
77. ABA-ALI MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACr § 6 (1971). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 160 (1974) (shares may be purchased only if capital will not be impaired). The result
is the same whether the surplus language or the impairment of capital language is used.
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third uses are proper, in that corporate considerations outweigh the
potential disadvantages to shareholders.
7 8
A company's repurchase of its shares has traditionally been far more
stringently regulated throughout Europe than in the United States. In
Britain, the decision in Trevor v. Howard" established the prohibition
against share repurchases. s0 France prohibits such acquisitions" with
two exceptions: a corporation may buy shares to distribute to employees
in a profit sharing plan,82 and companies listed on stock exchanges may
purchase up to 10 percent of their own shares, if the price is listed at 10
percent below net asset value per share. In the latter case, the company
must provide for reserves equal to the aggregate value of shares held.,
Shares may also be purchased, after a vote at a general shareholders'
meeting approving reduction for reasons other than losses, for the pur-
pose of retiring them. 4 Germany's statute is also restrictive, allowing
the company to acquire a maximum of 10 percent of its own shares only
if necessary to prevent serious damage to the company or for offer to
employees, or, pursuant to a shareholders' resolution, for redemption in
accordance with provisions concerning capital reduction. 5 Predictably,
the Sanders Draft absolutely prohibits the European Company from
acquiring its own shares. It further requires that any company acquired
by a European Company divest itself of any shares owned.86 The princi-
pal reason for this policy is the availability of less potentially dangerous
means of achieving the same goals. For example, instead of repurchasing
shares to offer to employees, as the French and German statutes allow,
the company may authorize a new issue.
Some states limit purchase to earned or paid-in surplus, a significant distinction. See CAL.
CoRP. CODE §§ 1706-09 (West 1955); MINN. STATS. ANN. § 301.22(6) (West 1969).
78. Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modem Corporation Laws, 28 FORDH. L. REV.
637, 653-60 (1960).
79. 12 App. Cas. 409 (H.L. 1887).
80. The court reasoned that there was no legitimate purpose for the purchase. If it were
to sell the shares, the corporation would be "trafficking," a prohibited practice; if it kept
them, it would have reduced the capital indirectly, also prohibited. The only legitimate
purpose posited was a buy-out of outsiders or dissidents where the objective was a closely-
held company - and this objective should have been reached by inducing shareholders
to purchase the shares personally. Id. at 417.
81. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 217.
82. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 217-1 (added by Article 1, Ordinance
No. 67-695 of August 17, 1967). Under this plan, the corporation may own at any time a
maximum of ten percent of its shares of any one class.
83. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 217-2.
84. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 217.
85. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 71(1).
86. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. 11-I-7.
87. Id. 328.
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The Second Directive is the most liberal of the European statutes,
providing only minimum conditions for acquisition. The company must
purchase shares so that proportional voting strength among sharehold-
ers is maintained and may not use the share repurchase power to give
insiders an escape from loss. Transactions must be separately author-
ized by a shareholders' meeting, with the acquisition not reducing net
assets below subscribed capital plus unavailable reserves (an approxi-
mation of impairment of capital). Shares held by the company may not
exceed 25 percent of the subscribed capital."8 Where necessary to pre-
vent injury to the corporation, the above requirements may be waived
as long as the acquisition does not reduce ifet assets below subscribed
capital and the face value or par of the shares purchased is less than 10
percent of subscribed capital." These restrictions do not apply to shares
acquired as a result of a vote for capital reduction."
The Second Directive appears to be more liberal than necessary to
effect a common scheme among the three member states under discus-
sion. The German scheme is most permissive, but allows acquisition of
only 10 percent of the company's shares and then only to prevent serious
damage to the company. The Directive seems not to recognize the po-
tential for abuse inherent in large-scale acquisition of company shares.
At a minimum, the percentage of shares permitted to be reacquired
should be reduced to ten. Serious thought should be given to Professor
Kessler's recommendation of a five percent limit.
D. DIVIDENDS
Two aspects of dividend policy may provide a basis for comparison of
national statutes: (1) who has responsibility for approving dividends
and (2) from what sources may they legally be declared. In America, the
corporate directors have sole power to declare dividends9' and may de-
cide whether to pay them in cash, property, or shares of the corpora-
tion's stock.92 American directors bear sole liability for dividends wrong-
fully declared.93 In Great Britain, the directors have a responsibility to
88. Second Directive, Art. 18, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. T 1371T (1974). Kessler recom-
mends that American statutes adopt a maximum treasury share holding of 5 percent.
Kessler, supra note 78, at 682. Cf. the French and German requirements, notes 81 and 85
supra.
89. Second Directive, Art. 18, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. I 1371T (1974).
90. Second Directive, Art. 19, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. T 1371U (1974).
91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(g) (1974); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 317 (1961).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 173 (1974).
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1974). A detailed discussion of the sources from which
American corporations may declare dividends and the possible abuses implicit therein is
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prepare before every ordinary meeting a scheme showing profits and
losses since the last meeting and recommending distribution of a percen-
tage of the profit as dividends. The recommendation must be approved
by the general meeting before any distribution may be made." British
law permits payment of dividends only when all calls due have been
paid. No payment of dividends may reduce capital stock, and the direc-
tors have discretion to set aside "such sum as they may think fit" as a
reserve.9 5 British courts will not interfere with a director's decision not
to pay a dividend, but an individual shareholder may bring suit to
restrain an improper payment." In contrast, French law provides that
it is the privilege of the shareholders, at general meeting, to allocate the
annual retained earnings among distributions to shareholders, disclosed
reserves, and earnings carried forward." The German statute, the Fifth
Directive and the European Company Statute give the directors power
to appropriate a substantial portion of the annual profit to corporate
reserves. The balance is to be allocated by the shareholders' meeting.
The British method of allocation appears most reasonable. The directors
do not make their decisions unchecked by shareholders, as is the case
in America, where freezing out of minority interests and withholding of
dividends for tax purposes are real dangers. In addition, the British
director is not subject to the whim of the shareholders regarding disposi-
tion of profits, nor should he be. Rather, the director's obligation is to
preserve the well-being of the company over the long term, whereas
shareholders, lacking business expertise, are likely to favor larger distri-
butions to themselves than are in the company's best interest. The
German provision, in effect a compromise between the French and Bri-
tish systems, limiting the shareholders' allocation to one-half of the
beyond the scope of this Article. Most states follow either the balance sheet test or the
net profits test, or both. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1974), allowing both tests.
For a discussion of the various tests, see Kreidman, Dividends - Changing Patterns, 57
COLUM. L. Rav. 372 (1957). See also Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model
Business Corporations Act, 70 HARV. L. Rav. 1357 (1957).
94. Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 91 [hereinafter
Companies Clauses Act]. See 6 HALSBURY'S LAws, supra note 75, at 72.
95. Companies Clauses Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 122.
96. Companies Clauses Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 122.
97. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 347.
98. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 58 (50 percent); Fifth Directive, Art. 50, 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 1403 (1974) (50 percent); Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. VI-6-1
(75 percent). The test for legality of distribution to be used under the European statutes
most closely approximates the earned surplus test. No distributions may be made while
capital is impaired; and in France and Germany every company must, for the protection
of creditors, hold a "statutory reserve" equal to 10 percent of its capital. Law of July 24,
1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 345; AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 150.
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annual profits, is an appropriate restriction of power and should be
adopted in the Fifth Directive, since adoption of the British method is
unlikely.
The new German and French acts were drawn in part to attract small
shareholders.99 In order to do so, it was necessary to prevent former
practices such as the creation of "hidden reserves"'' 0 which left the
shareholder powerless regarding dividends. The solution reached, allow-
ing the directors to appropriate up to 50 percent of the profit as reserves,
the other 50 percent being disposed of by the shareholders, seems to be
a meaningful and workable compromise. The British implementation of
the Directive should not be difficult as shareholders presently vote to
approve any distribution of dividends and the Directive does not fore-
close the directors from making recommendations as to the disposition
of profits-indeed, this seems a wise practice. Under the current laws
and proposals, the European shareholder's role in controlling use of
corporate profits is far superior to that of his American counterpart.
SUMMARY
The respective American and European laws regarding capitalization
produce fairly significant contrasts. In particular, the European law
seems to afford the shareholder greater protection in the valuation of
assets contributed in kind, reduction of capital, purchase of treasury
shares, and authorization of dividends. Despite the strict disclosure pro-
visions of the American federal securities laws, state corporation stat-
utes would be strengthened by the inclusion of sections providing for
independent valuation of assets in kind and strict limitation of the
amount .of capital to be held as treasury shares. As European law moves
toward unification, these safeguards should be stressed. The directives
should not resort to the most liberal alternatives available, as in the
treasury share provision, but should maintain rigorous standards, as in
the provision on capital reduction. Despite the difficulties inherent in
the coordination of nine national laws, the mandate of Treaty Article
54(3)(g), protection of investors in EEC companies, should be carried
out.
99. In 1965 only 7 percent of the British adult population held shares. Only 4 percent
held shares in commercial companies as opposed to governmental securities and invest-
ment trusts. On the continent, the figures were much smaller. Shareholding was effec-
tively restricted to the wealthy, both by inflexibly high par values and by the popularity
of "saving" as opposed to investing. THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 1966, at 52-3. For a discussion
of efforts made to attract German shareholders, see Baker, Shareownership in Germany,
1968 M.S.U. Bus. Topics 47, 68 (1968).
100. See Berger, Shareholder Rights Under the German Stock Corporation Law of 1965,
38 FORDH. L. REV. 687, 706 (1970).
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1I
THE SHAREHOLDER'S RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN
CORPORATE DECISIONS
Since the middle of this century, two trends among American corpora-
tions have emerged: companies have grown greatly through mergers and
conglomerations, and ownership has become very widely distributed.
The result is an anomolous position for the shareholder; he is an owner
with virtually no control over the management of his property.'"' Al-
though he is well protected under securities laws against abuses in stock
promotion and sales, he is generally powerless to influence management
decisions in the absence of ownership of a significant number of
shares.
, 02
Under the European company statutes, more power appears to be
vested in the company meeting, which must, for example, vote to dis-
pose of company profits and appoint auditors."3 The European company
has, in the past, been smaller and more closely held than its American
counterpart, reflecting the barriers of differing national laws, but the
impetus of the policies of the Common Market has been to increase
corporate size. This is especially true of the European Company Draft.
The effectiveness of shareholder input in Europe is determined to a
significant degree by the structure of the company. Britain shares the
American form of management in the board of directors and officers. In
Germany, and as an option under the French statute, the company is
run by a two-tier board; the management tier, the real power in the
company, is only indirectly responsible to the shareholders through the
supervisory tier. This section will compare the six statutes as they regu-
late company structure and meetings, shareholders' voting rights and
proxies.
A. COMPANY ORGANS
While American or British corporations have essentially two decision-
making organs-the shareholders' meeting and the board of direc-
101. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 249 (1969).
102. Id. at 250-55. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had as an object the restoration
of some power to the shareholder, and the New York Stock Exchange requires that stock
carry a vote to be listed. However, the management proxy and the tremendous diversity
of corporate ownership outweigh these measures. The shareholder does not protest man-
agement decisions with which he disagrees because his simple remedy is to sell and invest
elsewhere. Id.
103. See notes 113-16 infra and accompanying text.
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tors-the typical corporate form in continental Europe is a tripartite
model. The components of the European company are the shareholders'
meeting, a managing board which performs most of the functions of both
the officers and directors in an American corporation, and a supervisory
board which appoints the members of the management board and serves
in an advisory or "watchdog" capacity. The two-tier European structure
has gained momentum since passage of the French commercial statute
in 1966, which gives a company the option of adopting the single-tier
administrative board form or the German two-tier structure.' The Fifth
Directive makes the two-tier form mandatory,' 5 however, as does the
European Company Statute.0 8 It is this provision which to a great ex-
tent has made passage of both of these proposed statutes so controver-
sial.
Part of the controversy centers on the composition of the Supervisory
Board. The German law requires that for companies with more than 500
employees, at least one-third of the members of the supervisory board
must represent labor. In the coal and steel industries and in very large
companies this number is increased to one-half. I The resulting dilution
of shareholder power has been considered severe, since labor, having
essentially the same interests as management in the business aspects of
the company, may convert the sup6rvisory board into a tool of the man-
agement board, which already has enormous power.' 8 The two-tier di-
rectorate and labor representation on the board (co-determination) have
been very controversial in Britain since it joined the EEC. Though both
ideas are gaining some acceptance among both labor and management,
the extensive changes which implementation would necessitate and the
uncertain political climate in Britain indicate that passage of the Fifth
Directive and wholesale adoption of the European Company Statute
may yet be considerably delayed.' 0 The relative merits of the two corpo-
rate forms have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere," '0 and are relevant
to this Article only as they affect the shareholders' exercise of control.
104. See generally Kohler, The New Corporation Laws in Germany (1966) and France
(1967) and the Trend Towards a Uniform Corporation Law for the Common Market, 43
TUL. L. REv. 58 (1969).
105. Art. 2, 1 CCH Comm. MKr. REP. T 1401B (1974).
106. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Arts. IV-l-l, IV-2-1.
107. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 96. See Vagts, supra note 17.
108. Roth, supra note 22, at 1381.
109. See Dalton, supra note 17; THE ECONOMIST, July 20, 1974, at 53.
110. See, e.g., Brua, Worker Groups Gain Power in Common Market Companies, 51
HAnv. Bus. REv. 8 (Nov.-Dec. 1973); Roth, supra note 22; Schoenbaum and Lieser, Reform
of the Structure of the American Corporation: The "Two-Tier" Board Model, 62 Ky. L.J.
91 (1973); Vagts, supra note 17.
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B. THE CORPORATE MEETING
It is the company meeting which allows the shareholder to exercise
whatever degree of control he has. The company articles generally may
not be amended without the approval of at least two-thirds of the share-
holders attending a meeting, and no change in company structure may
be effected without at least a similar majority. The meeting also affords
protection to owners of classes of shares since no change in the financial
structure of the company can occur without separate approval of each
class of shares affected. While in the United States the strength of the
management proxy machinery and the wide distribution of ownership
have a great effect on individual shareholder control, in Europe other
factors such as bearer shares, the relative weakness of proxy machinery,
and the lack of quorum requirements may have an equally great effect
in discouraging shareholder participation in meetings. This section will
consider the form and agenda of meetings in the countries under consid-
eration, and provisions for inclusion of shareholder proposals in proxy
statements.
Shareholder meetings in the United States are of two types: annual
and special. The annual meeting has as its primary purpose the election
of directors, but any other proper business may be considered. The usual
quorum requirement is representation of a majority of the outstanding
shares. For passage a resolution generally requires a majority of shares
present and voting. However, resolutions which will amend the articles
of incorporation or the organic structure of the corporation usually re-
quire greater majorities, which are specified in the articles. A special
meeting may be called by the directors or by such persons as are author-
ized by the by-laws, but it may consider only the issues set forth in the
notice of the meeting."'
The shareholders' meeting in European countries has more specific
functions than the American meeting. Besides electing directors and
approving organic changes, the annual British general meeting," must
approve any distribution of dividends."' Shareholder approval is also
111. CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 251-53.
112. One general meeting must be held each year; on default, the Board of Trade may
call a meeting. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 131. An extraordinary meeting must
be convened on requisition of members holding 10 percent or more of paid-up capital. Id.
§ 132. As in the American special meeting, business at an extraordinary meeting is limited
to that set forth in the notice convening the meeting. Companies Clauses Act, 8 & 9 Vict.,
c. 16, § 69.
113. The articles may provide that directors may pay an iterim dividend after deter-
mining that profits will be sufficient. Final approval by the meeting is required. 6
HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 75, at 402.
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required for removal of directors, determination of remuneration of aud-
itors and augmentation of capital."' In addition to performing these
functions, the German meeting must dispose of retained earnings, re-
lease the members of the supervisory and managing boards and appoint
auditors."5 While the French general meeting convenes primarily to
decide all questions relating to annual financial statements, 'additional
duties include ratification of administrators or supervisory board mem-
bers, approval or annulment of agreements between administrators or
managers and the company, and authorization of bond issues."6
Transaction of any business in a British meeting requires a quorum,
generally specified in the articles. If none is specified, the. minimum is
five percent of capital or twenty persons."7 While German meetings are
subject to no quorum requirement at all, a French meeting is valid only
if 50 percent of shares carrying the right to vote are represented at an
extraordinary meeting, 25 percent at a general meeting."' Though the
necessity of a substantial quorum may cause inconvenience and expense
for the management, it seems an important safeguard of minority rights,
especially if notice provisions are not adequate, as is the case in Ger-
many.
119
A special meeting, one other than the annual meeting called to con-
sider only specific resolutions, may be requested at any time by a minor-
ity of the shareholders in Britain,2 " France' or Germany. 2' The French
provision, in addition, gives the right to call a general or special meeting
to the auditors, a court-appointed agent, or liquidators, if the manage-
ment fails to do so.1n This provision is a sound one; anyone in a position
to know of management wrongdoing ought to be able to call a meeting
and place such knowledge before the shareholders, especially where
114. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 184, 159, 61.
115. AktG, [1965] BGBI.1 1089, § 119.
116. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Arts. 157, 103.
117. 6 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 75, at 66. The articles may specify, however, that
three members will constitute a quorum. Id. See Gower, supra note 61, at 1391, where the
American open agenda and substantial quorum requirements are contrasted with the
British closed agenda and minimal quorum requirement.
118. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Arts. 153, 155.
119. See notes 130-31 infra and accompanying text.
120. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 134(b). The members wishing to call the
meeting must number 5 percent of the shareholders or hold 10 percent of the capital stock.
121. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 158.
122. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089,§ 122. Shareholders wishing to call a meeting must
control 5 percent or more of the company's capital unless the articles provide otherwise.
123. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 158. The court will appoint an
agent on the request of holders of 10 percent of the stated capital.
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legal remedies are less available to the shareholder than they are in the
United States.
2 4
The Sanders Draft incorporates features from both the French and
German laws. Reserved to the shareholders' meeting are the powers to
increase or reduce capital, to issue convertible bonds, to appoint or
dismiss members of the supervisory board, to appoint auditors, to dis-
pose of the annual profit, to amend the articles of incorporation, and to
dissolve, transform, merge, or consolidate.'1 While no distinction as to
quorum or majority requirements is made between extraordinary and
general meetings, specific requirements are stipulated with respect to
important resolutions such as amendments of the articles.' 21 Minority
shareholders may request the calling of a meeting.'2
The Fifth Directive is ,silent on several important questions relating
to meetings. Although it'provides for a general meeting at least once a
year and gives certain minority shareholders the right to call meetings,
28
it does not specify the meeting's powers and sets out no majority require-
ment beyond those provided in national laws.'1 Furthermore, the Direc-
tive specifies no quorum requirement, a serious failing which may en-
able a potentially small percentage of the shareholders to control com-
pany policy.'3' Since most of the EEC countries authorize bearer shares,
this directive failing is aggravated since holders of such shares receive
notice of shareholder meetings only through publication. The result, in
countries such as Germiany, is that banks, the main depositories of
German shares, vote 85-90 percent of shares in large stock companies.'3'
Though a quorum requirement in the Directive would require a signifi-
cant change in the German shareholder meeting, the change would be
124. See notes 286-92, 304-08 infra and accompanying text.
125. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-3-1.
126. Id.
127. Id. Art. IV-3-2.
128. Art. 16, 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 1401R (1974).
129. Art. 36, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1402L (1974).
130. Lack of a quorum requirement is very dangerous where a resolution not included
in the agenda may be proposed and voted on at the meeting. The Fifth Directive provides
some protection in that no item may be voted on if it did not appear on the agenda except:
(1) dismissal of supervisory board members, (2) the bringing of suits on behalf of the
corporation against such board members, or (3) the calling of a new meeting. In countries
such as Germany, where bearer shareholders are not likely to receive notice of meetings,
the Fifth Directive offers little protection to shareholder rights. See Gower, supra note 61,
at 1391.
131. Roth, supra note 22, at 1379. Shareholders in countries permitting bearer shares
apparently view them benignly; tolerance of bank proxies is high and holding shares in
bearer form may result in substantial tax savings. See Storm, Statute of a Societas
Europaea, 5 CoMm. MKT. L. REv. 265, 280 (1968); Vagts, supra note 17, at 54.
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a beneficial one for the small shareholder and such a requirement should
be included.
Besides the protection afforded by quorum and majority require-
ments, shareholders in all countries considered have the right to submit
resolutions for inclusion in the meeting agenda. In the United States the
right is provided not by corporations statutes but by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in Rule 14a-8.32 Under the Rule, any shareholder
may submit, within a reasonable time prior to the annual meeting, a
proposal regarding any proper company purpose.' If the company op-
poses the resolution, the shareholder may also have included in the
company's proxy statement a 200-word paragraph supporting it.3' If the
submission of the proposal is timely, the shareholder may present and
defend it at the meeting.' The German Stock Company Act of 1965
contains a section modeled after Rule 14a-8. A single shareholder who
submits a timely proposal has a right to have it communicated to other
shareholders unless such communication would be illegal.' The pro-
posal may be no more than 100 words in length. However, if the same
shareholder has submitted a proposal in the previous two years and
failed to present it at a meeting or if the same proposal has been badly
defeated at a recent meeting, the company may refuse to publish it.' 37
Significantly, the German shareholder may present a proposal nominat-
ing a slate of candidates for the supervisory board; the American share-
holder has no say in the nomination of directors.'38
The German and American laws are the only laws affording a single
shareholder the right to submit a proposal. In Great Britain a proposal
requires the support of five percent of the capital stock or 100 sharehold-
ers, who must submit it six weeks prior to the meeting and bear the
expenses of publication.' 39 While the proposal is limited to 1,000
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1970).
133. Management may refuse to include the proposal in its proxy form if its submission
is not timely or if it fails to comply with restrictions set forth in note 147 infra. A decision
not to include the proposal must be reported to the SEC and the shareholder not later
than thirty days prior to the date of filing of the preliminary proxy.
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (1975). See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d
Cir. 1947); Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder Proposed Rule: A Decade Later, 40
NOTRE DAME LAw. 13 (1964).
135' 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1975).
136. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 126.
137. AktG, [19651 BGB1.I 1089, § 126. The provision is very much like SEC Rule 14a-
8(c)(3), (4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(3), (4) (1975). See note 147 infra.
138. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 127. See Note, A Proposal for the Designation of
Shareholder Nominees for Director in the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM L. REV.
1139 (1974).
139. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 140.
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words," I the company may refuse to circulate the proposal if it is satis-
fied the right is being used to publish defamatory matter.' Similarly,
under French law, shareholders representing five percent of the capital
may submit for inclusion on the agenda any proposal not concerning the
election of the administrative or supervisory boards.' While eliminat-
ing the harassment of proposals submitted for purely personal reasons,
the imposition of the minimum capital or number of shareholders re-
quirements will surely prevent many shareholders from submitting le-
gitimate proposals. Although all shareholders may inspect company reg-
isters, 43 the practical burdens of convincing ninety-nine others of the
merits of a proposal and funding publication to all shareholders will be
an effective barrier to most incipient proposals.
The French and British requirements are essentially duplicated in the
Sanders Draft and the Fifth Directive. The capital requirement under
the former is five percent or 250,000 u.a.'" and under the latter up to
five percent or 100,000 u.a."5 Under the Fifth Directive, the shareholder
must submit his counter-proposal within five days of the dispatch of the
letter announcing the general meeting.' In combination with the capi-
tal requirements, this stringent time requirement appears to preclude
any small shareholder resolutions. To provide any meaningful right to
shareholders to have proposals considered at meetings, the Directive
ought to reduce to twenty or fewer the number of signatures required
on the petition and extend the time limit at least to conform to the
German requirements. Adoption of Rule 14a-8(c)(3) and (c)(4) restric-
tions would ensure elimination of frivolous proposals.
4 7
140. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 140; see Gower, supra note 61, at 1393.
141. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 140.
142. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 160.
143. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 113.
144. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-3-2(3).
145. Art. 25(1), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1402 (1974).
146. Art. 25(1), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1402 (1974).
147. Rule 14a-8(c)(3) provides thatif the management has, at the shareholder's request,
included his proposal in its proxy statement and form of proxy for either of the last two
annual meetings and the shareholder has failed to present the proposal in person or by
proxy, management may refuse to include the proposal. Under Rule 14a-8(c)(4) manage-
ment may refuse the shareholder's request to include his proposal if substantially the same
proposal has been submitted within the last five years and has received no more than (1)
3 percent of the vote if submitted only once; (2) 6 percent of the vote at its last submission
if submitted twice; and (3) 10 percent of the vote at its last submission if submitted three
times. Management may not refuse to include such proposal after three years from the
last submission. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(3), (4) (1975).
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C. VOTING RIGHTS
Except in Britain, where share voting is generally on a per capita
basis, '4 the usual rule is that each share is entitled to one vote. Of course
exceptions to this rule exist. Preferred stock does not necessarily carry
voting power in the United States, "I although in most states such shares
may vote whenever a proposed increase or decrease of capital or a
change of preference or powers might have a potentially adverse effect.'
The German law provides for non-voting preferred shares as well' and
prohibits multiple voting rights. 5 ' Company articles in Germany 3 and
France' "54 may limit the number of votes for a large number of shares held
by a single person as long as the limit is imposed uniformly. While
voting rights usually do not commence until a share is paid in full,'
French law requires that every share have at least one vote' 8 and pro-
vides for a double voting right for any fully paid-up share held by a
French national or national of an EEC member state for two years or
more. 57 British law is very straightforward on voting rights; every mem-
ber of the company is entitled to one vote by show of hands at a share-
holders' meeting, unless a poll is demanded. In that case, each share-
holder votes in proportion to the amount of capital he holds.,"
The ability to exercise an informed vote depends on the adequacy of
notice provisions and shareholder access to company lists and financial
148. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, Sched. 1, Table A, art. 62. The company may
not refuse a poll if it is demanded by five members or one or more members holding 10
percent of the stock. Id., art. 58.
149. See, e.g., DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1974).
150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(2) (1974); see CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 255.
151. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, §§ 12, 140.
152. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 12. If necessary to safeguard overriding interests of
the national economy, the highest court of the German state in which the company is
located may grant an exception to this provision.
153. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 134(1).
154. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 177.
155. See, e.g., AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 134(2). In France, failure to pay any
amount remaining on a share after notice from the company results in loss of voting rights.
Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 283.
156. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 174.
157. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 175. The traditional argument for
such multiple voting rights is that they prevent "foreign domination of corporations." See
Berger, supra note 100, at 724. The French obviously made a concession to the EEC Treaty
and the right of establishment in modifying the double vote privilege to include nationals
of EEC member states. Cf. the recent Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act, REV.
STAT. CAN., c. 46 (1973), requiring government approval of any new business to be estab-
lished under foreign or predominantly foreign control.
158. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, Sched. 1, Table A, art. 62 and § 137. See note
148 supra.
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information.' 59 Notice requirements among the six statutes do not vary
substantially. Generally owners of registered shares must be informed
by mail two or three weeks before the date of the general meeting. '
However, requirements for a special meeting may be more lenient as to
time.'6 ' Holders of bearer shares are usually notified by publication,
2
though the new German law requires banks to act as intermediaries,
individually informing those whose shares are on deposit with them of
the meeting.'
American shareholders are afforded the most complete statutory ac-
cess to corporate books and records and shareholder lists."4 State stat-
utes vary widely, however, and the shareholder may be required to prove
that he has a proper purpose for inspection or that he meets minimum
holding requirements.' Although corporations are generally reluctant
to allow inspection' 6 and will often force a court battle, the stockholder
usually wins.' 7
The new French law closely approximates the American statutes.
From the date a shareholders' meeting is called, any member of a com-
pany or his representative may inspect designated company documents,
including the profit and loss statement, the general operating account,
the balance sheet, and the remuneration of the highest-paid company
officials; he may also inspect and copy the shareholders list."8 No show-
ing of proper purpose nor minimum capital holding is required.
In Great Britain, the shareholder has access only to stockholder
lists.' 9 While ten percent of the shareholders may petition the Board of
Trade to appoint an inspector if they suspect fraud or misconduct of
directors, or if they are not receiving information they would normally
159. See CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 1020.
160. See, e.g., Decree No. 67-236 of March 23, 1967, J.O. of March 24, 1967, Art. 126
(two weeks); AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 125 (nineteen days); Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo.
6, c. 38, § 133(1)(a) (three weeks); Fifth Directive, Art. 24(3), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
1401Z (1974) (two weeks); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222 (1974) (not less than ten nor more
than sixty days).
161. See, e.g., Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 133(1)(b) (two weeks).
162. See, e.g., Decree No. 67-236 of March 23, 1967, J.O. of March 24, 1967, Art. 126;
Fifth Directive, Art. 24(3), 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 1401Z (1974); Sanders Draft, supra
note 24, Art. IV-3-3(1). Both the Sanders Draft and the Fifth Directive require that notice
by publication be given at least one month before the meeting.
163. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 128.
164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974).
165. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 46 (1971).
166. CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 1026; see Gower, supra note 61, at 1387.
167. CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 1026.
168. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Arts. 168, 169.
169. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 113.
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expect,' 0 inspectors have been appointed in only a small minority of
cases in which complaints have been registered. Merely registering a
complaint, however, is often enough to get relief."' Nevertheless, the
remedy does not seem adequate. Shareholders should have a right to
acquire specific information concerning the company's financial status
without having to show reason to suspect misfeasance on the part of the
directors.
The German alternative to inspection of books, which has been
adopted by the Fifth Directive"' and the Sanders Draft,' 3 is to provide
any shareholder at the meeting with such information as is necessary to
allow him to vote intelligently on matters before the meeting.," The
management may refuse to supply such information only (1) where re-
lease of such information would injure the company, (2) to the extent it
relates to specific taxes, or (3) if furnishing such information would
render the managing board criminally liable.' 5 The Sanders Draft and
Fifth Directive allow only the first and third justifications for not fur-
nishing information, 7 but the shareholder may petition the court to
require disclosure of any information refused."'
If used well, this German requirement should provide significant lev-
erage for active and concerned minority shareholders. Since each
shareholder may have access to the annual accounts statement prior to
the shareholders' meeting' 8 and accountants are required to attend
meetings,"' most aspects of the company's finances should be available.
Implementation of this practice in America would increase sharehold-
ers' power significantly because of the larger attendance by individual
shareholders at American meetings.' 0 However, the effect of the adop-
tion of the Fifth Directive would again be felt most in Britain where the
requirements that company members be furnished an annual report and
170. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 164.
171. Gower, supra note 61, at 1387-88.
172. Art. 31, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1402F (1974).
173. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-3-7.
174. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 131.
175. AktG, [19651 BGB1.I 1089, § 131. See Kohler, supra note 104, at 77-78; Steefel
and von Falkenhausen, supra note 17, at 546-47.
176. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-3-7(3); Fifth Directive, Art. 31(3), 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. T 1402F (1974).
177. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 132; Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-3-7(5);
Fifth Directive, Art. 31(4), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. % 1402F (1974).
178. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 175; Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. VI-1-5; Fifth
Directive, Art. 30, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. I 1402E (1974).
179. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 176.
180. See Roth, supra note 22, at 1379.
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any information requested at annual meetings would dramatically im-
prove the lot of the minority shareholder.
D. PROXIES
At common law all shareholders had to be present in order to cast
their votes,' 8 ' but as corporations increased in size and number of share-
holders, the personal attendance requirement became impracticable
and proxy voting was instituted.' 2 American corporate statutes now
routinely provide for proxy representation.'3 In addition, the SEC af-
fords extensive protection through its proxy regulation procedures to
holders of registered shares of companies with 500 or more shareholders
and assets of over $1,000,000.8 1 Any proxy solicitation under Section 14
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must provide the security holder
with information sufficient to give him an adequate factual background
for voting intelligently.' 5 All material included in the solicitation must
be filed with the SEC, which has power to enjoin the solicitation or the
voting of proxies where it believes, or has reason to believe, misleading
statements are being used.' 8 Thus, all registered shareholders of a com-
pany within the scope of SEC regulations are assured of significant
disclosure of all facts relevant to the casting of an informed vote.
No European statute provides such extensive protection for share-
holders. Under the British Companies Act, every shareholder has the
right to appoint another person, who need not be a shareholder, to
attend the meeting and vote for him.'8 However, the Act requires no
specific disclosure in proxy statements; compared to the American
requirements, therefore, it is pitifully weak.sm
The French law similarly states that a shareholder may appoint an-
other shareholder or his spouse to represent him at the meeting. Unfor-
tunately while such representative has all the rights of the shareholder
181. See CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 254; Garrett, Attitudes on Corporate Democracy
- A Critical Analysis, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 310, 313 (1956).
182. Garrett, supra note 181, at 312-13.
183. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1974).
184. Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Securi-
ties Act Amendments of 1964, provides that any issuer with $1,000,000 in assets and a class
of equity security held by 500 or more persons must register its shares. 15 U.S.C. §
78(l)(g)(1) (1970). Such company thereby becomes bound under the proxy rules of Section
14 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(1970).
185. SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1975).
186. SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1975).
187. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 136(1). The notice of the meeting must inform
the shareholder of this right. Id. § 136(2).
188. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 161.
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at the meeting,' 9 the statute fails to provide for the sending of informa-
tion to the shareholder prior to the meeting in order that he may intelli-
gently direct the representative's voting.
The drafters of the 1965 German law were sensitive to the widespread
criticism of the practice of having bearer share owners authorize the
banks with whom their shares were deposited to represent them at
shareholders' meetings for up to fifteen months, which authorizations
were often automatically renewed.9 0 The shareholder had no effective
control over the bank's vote. In fact the bank was not required to inform
the shareholder of pending major actions (such as amendment of the
articles) until 1952."'1 The three largest banks in Germany thus wielded
tremendous power in the country's major corporations."2
The 1965 Act borrows somewhat from American proxy regulations.
Banks now are obliged to forward to shareholders with certificates on
deposit any communications received regarding meetings, resolutions
and shareholders' proposals."3 The bank must also inform the depositor
of its own voting proposals and request instructions from the share-
holder, indicating that in the absence of such instructions, the bank will
vote in accord with its proposals."4 A form for the shareholder's vote
must be attached to the notification, and the bank must further disclose
any interlocking management or supervisory board memberships be-
tween the bank and the company."' Before it may vote any depositor's
shares, the bank must have a written power of attorney."'0 Furthermore,
it may vote in contravention of the shareholder's instructions only where
it may assume that, knowing all the facts, the shareholder would have
189. See Vagts, supra note 17, at 53-58. The author points out several forms of conflict
and abuse possible in the bank depository system:
As a depositary of a corporation's funds, the bank may wish to keep the firm from
withdrawing its deposits into other uses. As underwriter for the company, it may
vote for a new stock issue which disinterested analysts would find unnecessary.
As creditor of the company, it may prefer to see its debtor's earnings retained to
give it additional security rather than paid out as dividends to the shareholders
it is supposed to represent. . . . Where the bank is confronted with corporate
management not dependent on shareholder support, it may be so anxious to
maintain its position as "house bank" that it will be reluctant to question or
oppose management actions.
Id. at 57.
190. Id. at 54.
191. Id. at 55.
192. Id. See also Roth, supra note 22, at 1379.
193. AktG, [19651 BGB1.I 1089, § 128(1).
194. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 128(2).
195. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 128(2).
196. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 135(1).
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authorized such a change,'97 and the shareholder must be notified of any
such vote with reasons stated for its exercise.' 8 Although the controversy
over the banker's vote is far from settled, the shareholder's position
appears much stronger as a result of the Act.
The Fifth Directive has incorporated the German provisions with few
changes. Every shareholder has the right to appoint another shareholder
to represent him at a meeting.'99 Where any person or company publicly
invites shareholders to send proxy forms to him and offers to appoint
agents for them, the appointment is valid only for one meeting, or a
second meeting with the same agenda. ' This contrasts with the Ger-
man power of attorney which is valid for fifteen months.2 1' In addition
to informing the shareholder of the agenda and pending resolutions, the
proxy solicitation form must indicate that the annual accounts and
contracts requiring shareholder approval are available to any share-
holder requesting them. 20 2 Furthermore, the solicitor must state how he
intends to vote if the shareholder sends no instructions, with provisions
for deviating from the shareholder's mandate substantially identical to
the German Act.202 Adoption of the Directive would provide guidelines
for French and British companies which solicit proxies and increase the
potential for shareholders to exercise an intelligent, informed vote.
In view of the stringent protection it affords shareholders in other
areas, the European Company Statute is surprisingly weak regarding
proxies. Given its size and the international character of its sharehold-
ers, the European Company, more than most national companies, is
likely to have a substantial proxy vote at any meeting. Similar to the
British and French enactments, the Statute provides only that a share-
holder may appoint a representative (other than company board mem-
bers) to vote for him at shareholders' meetings and that such appoint-
ment must be in writing and deposited with the company prior to the
opening of the meeting.2 4 Although the proxy is limited to six months
(effectively on meeting), 25 a provision which the drafters feel gives sig-
nificant protection to the shareholder in preventing accumulation of
proxy power in banks, ' this protection appears minimal, particularly
197. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 135(8).
198. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 135(8).
199. Art. 27, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1402B (1974).
200. Art. 28(1)(a), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1402C (1974).
201. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 128.
202. Art. 28(1)(d)(aa), (bb), (cc), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1402C (1974).
203. Art. 28(e), (f), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1402C(1974).
204. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-3-5(1), (2).
205. Id. Art. IV-3-5-(3).
206. Id. 519.
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since a proxy is easily renewable and the lack of any information re-
quirement may lead to abuse. The European Company Statute should
as a minimum include a provision such as that drafted in the German
Stock Company Act and adopted by the Fifth Directive.
SUMMARY
Judging from the American experience, as European corporations
expand and their shareholders become more numerous, great care will
have to be taken in order to protect what control the shareholder has.
Assuming its implementation under the Fifth Directive, if the supervi-
sory board serves its designated function, it may be an effective tool in
safeguarding the shareholders' interests. The German experience has
shown, however, that with employee representation on the supervisory
board the management board may manipulate the supervisory board.
In France, where the two-tier structure is optional, too few companies
have adopted it to make a judgment on the effectiveness of an all-
shareholder-elected supervisory board.
Deliberate consideration should also be given to quorum require-
ments. In Germany the lack of a quorum requirement is balanced by
fairly stringent proxy regulations and notice requirements; in other EEC
courtries, however, holders of bearer shares receive notice of meetings
only by publication. The combination of no quorum requirement with
lax proxy regulations critically undermines the bearer shareholder's
right to meaningfully participate in company meetings. The Fifth Direc-
tive and the European Company Statute must be reformed to protect
this important interest.
Finally, as companies increase in size, it will become more important
to ensure shareholder access to company financial information and to
have good faith shareholder proposals more readily communicated in
the proxy statement. Where the vote becomes the shareholder's only
effective voice, he must be able to exercise it in an intelligent and
informed manner.
III
THE SHAREHOLDER AND THE DIRECTORS
An extensive study of the directors' duties toward the shareholders
would require an entire paper or book. This section will focus simply on
those aspects of the shareholder-director or -manager relationship which
are regulated by statute: election and removal of directors, shareholder
ratification of loans to directors and of contracts in which directors are
interested parties, the statutory standard of care required of directors,
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and actions which may be brought by shareholders on behalf of the
company against directors who have violated those standards.
A. ELECTION AND REMOVAL
In most American public corporations, shareholders have little effec-
tive input into the makeup of the board of directors: ". . . The fact is
that the stockholders elect the directors but they do not choose them.
They are chosen by the board of directors itself, which makes the
nominations. '20 7 Proponents of this system argue that it is necessary to
have the directors control membership on the board in the interests of
efficiency since organization of a real shareholder election would be
costly and could well result in a board of such diversity in business skill
and interests that essential decision-making would falter. In fact, Pro-
fessor Chayes argues that the shareholder should be completely disen-
franchised because he may so easily remove himself from the corporate
constituency.
28
The contrary argument is that minority shareholders have little effect
in shareholder meetings and could most effectively obtain representa-
tion on policy matters through election of their own candidates to the
board of directors.2 11 Cumulative voting,210 an institution now required
in thirteen states either by state constitution or statutes, and permitted
in seventeen others,21' may secure such representation on the board.
European commentators frown on cumulative voting and classification
of directors, however, because they feel that minority representatives on
the board promote factionalism and decrease efficiency:
On the whole, the English still think of boards of directors as supervisory
managers, who should be united in policy and outlook with the rest of
management, rather than as representatives of divergent interests over-
seeing the managers .... 12
207. Ruml, Corporate Management as a Locus of Power, in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL
CONCEPTS 229 (N.Y.U. 1959). See Conard, Functions of Directors Under the Existing
System, 27 Bus. LAW. Supp. 23, 27 (1972).
208. Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law in THE CORPOATION IN
MODERN SociErv 40 (E. Mason, ed. 1959). In Chayes' view, the shareholder is adequately
protected "if financial information is made available, fraud and overreaching are pre-
vented, and a market is maintained in which [his] shares may be sold." Id.
209. See Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director in
the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (1974).
210. Cumulative voting provisions allow each shareholder, in an election of directors,
to cast votes equal to the number of shares he owns multiplied by the number of director-
ships to be filled in favor of a single candidate. See CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 285-87.
211. Id. at 287. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1974).
212. See Gower, supra note 61, at 1390.
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Other than cumulative voting, the minority shareholder has no effec-
tive vehicle for securing board representation. The SEC proxy rules
regarding inclusion of shareholder proposals in proxy solicitation mate-
rials specifically exclude nominations for elections to corporate office. '
Although corporate statutes provide for election of directors at the
annual meeting, shareholders rarely vote against nominees of the direc-
tors. The board is, in general, a self-perpetuating body."' Where a va-
cancy occurs the directors may make an interim appointment, to be
ratified or rejected at the next shareholders' meeting. ' Directors in the
United States are generally removable only for cause, although a few
statutes do provide for removal without cause by shareholders' majority
vote. Such removal is rare." '
British companies must have at least two directors " who must be
registered shareholders 8 not more than seventy years old." ' If not other-
wise specified in the articles, one-third of the directors shall retire each
year; however, any director may be re-elected immediately or at any
time thereafter.2 0 In Britain a director may be removed by ordinary
resolution of the company at any time before the expiration of his term,
provided he receives special notice of the resolution and has an oppor-
tunity to be heard on the resolution at the meeting.' Remaining direc-
tors may fill any vacancy on the board, and such appointment is effec-
tive until the expiration of the term being filled.2
In French companies adopting the single-tier structure, the share-
holders elect members of the administrative board for a term of six
years, and these board members may be re-elected.1 They must hold
shares equal to the minimum required for participation in shareholders'
213. SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a-8(a) (1975). The German proxy statute specifi-
cally allows shareholder nomination proposals. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
214. Hetherington, supra note 101, at 252. The self-perpetuation is aggravated by the
fact that in the United States, directors generally are subject to no maximum term. See,
e.g., DEiL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1974).
215. CARY. CASES, supra note 59, at 154.
216. Id. Cary notes the contrast with European custom in the difficulty of removal of
directors. Id. at 155.
217. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 176. This requirement is in contrast with most
American statutes, which permit one-man corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(b) (1974).
218. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 181, 182. An American director usually need
not be a stockholder. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1974).
219. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 185.
220. Companies Clauses Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 88.
221. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 241.
222. Companies Clauses Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 89.
223. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 90. The board may consist of from
three to twelve members. Id. Art. 89.
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meetings. 22 In contrast to the American and British laws, a stock com-
pany may serve as a board member, but the company must designate a
permanent representative to be subject to the same conditions and obli-
gations as if he were a director in his own name.22 Additionally, the
shareholders may dismiss board members at any ordinary meeting.
2 26
French companies have had the option of adopting the two-tier corpo-
ration model since 1966.22 Companies choosing this model maintain an
election procedure very similar to that followed by German companies
and to the suggested procedures under the Fifth Directive and the Euro-
pean Company proposals. The managing board, or directorate, consist-
ing of one or more persons 22 appointed by the supervisory board, 29 has
broad power to carry out the day-to-day functions of the corporation, to
formulate policy, and to represent the company in all transactions with
outside parties.o While the term of managing board members in France
is four years,2' in Germany it is five. 12 Furthermore, in Germany the
term may be extended for five years on a resolution of the supervisory
board.?- The managing board member need not be a shareholder.24 In
both France and Germany managing board members are subject to
224. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 95.
225. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 91. Under American securities law,
a director or officer of one company sitting on the board of another represents his company
for purposes of Section 16(b) insider trading. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d
260 (2d Cir. 1969).
226. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 90.
227. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 118. See Kohler, supra note 104,
at 71. The French wanted a stock company law comparable to the laws of the other EEC
countries, especially Germany; it was felt that adoption of features of the other European
laws would improve France's bargaining position in unification negotiation. Corporate
ideology thus played a small role in the decision. Id. at 59.
228. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 119. The maximum number of
management board members is five. Id. See AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 76.
229. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 120. No person may serve on the
management board and the supervisory board simultaneously. Id., Art. 133. See AktG,
[1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 105; Fifth Directive Art. 6, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1401F
(1974).
230. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 124. See AktG, [1965] BGB1.I
1089, § 82. The French statute enumerates the powers of the management board. The
German law provides that the powers of the management board to represent the company
"cannot be limited," but that the board must comply with restrictions imposed by the
statutes, by the articles of the company, and by acts of the general meeting or the supervi-
sory board.
231. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 122.
232. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 84. See Fifth Directive, Art. 7, 1 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 1401G (1974) (six years).
233. AktG, [19651 BGB1.I 1089, § 84.
234. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 120.
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dismissal by the supervisory board "for compelling reasons," such as
breach of duty, incompetence, or a "no-confidence" vote of the share-
holders.? The supervisory board of the court may fill any vacancy for
the remainder of the term and a director wrongly dismissed has an
action for damages against the company.23 -
The supervisory board in Germany and France serves to safeguard the
interests of the shareholders by reviewing the activities of the managing
board, especially with respect to company accounts and finances. 7 In
addition, it represents the company in dealings with the managing
board both in and out of court. The most significant difference between
the German25 and French219 boards is that in Germany the supervisory
board is elected, two-thirds by the shareholders and one-third by com-
pany employees, while in France all board members are elected by the
shareholders. The Fifth Directive and the Sanders Draft provide for
supervisory boards which follow closely the German pattern.
Some question exists as to the effectiveness of the supervisory board
in controlling management. While commentators suggest the board is
either too much "inside" or too much "outside," it is clear a workable
balance is not easily maintained.2 11 Where the supervisors become but
235. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 121; AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089,
§ 84(3). See Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-1-2(7); Fifth Directive, Art. 13, 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 1041N (1974). A further restriction on management board members
is that they are forbidden, in Germany from holding any other management appointment,
and in France from holding more than one other. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26,
1966, Art. 127; AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 88(3). See Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art.
IV-1-8(2); Fifth Directive, Art. 9, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. % 1401J (1974).
236. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 121; AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089,
§ 85.
237. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 111. See Vagts, supra note 17, at 48-55.
238. The German supervisory board consists of from three to twenty-one members,
depending on the stated capital of the company. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 95. The
term of office for a board member is four years and vacancies may be filled by the
supervisory board for the remainder of the unexpired term. Id. §§ 102, 104. Unless the
articles specify otherwise, removal of a member of the supervisory board requires a three-
fourths majority of the shareholders' meeting or a court order pursuant to petition of the
supervisory board if a "compelling reason" exists. Id. § 103.
239. French supervisory board members must be natural persons and shareholders;
their term of office may not exceed six years but members are generally eligible for re-
election. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 134. The board may fill vacancies
subject to shareholder ratification; the shareholders' meeting may dismiss a member of
the supervisory board at any time. Id. Arts. 134, 137.
Both the German and the French laws limit the number of supervisory boards on which
an individual may serve; in France, the limit is eight; in Germany, ten. Law of July 24,
1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 136; AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 103(2).
240. See Vagts, supra note 17, at 52. Vagts states that the board meets too infrequently
(four times a year) and thus "understands relatively little about the affairs of the firm
and often rubber-stamps management decisions." Id.
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another arm of the managing board, the shareholder's chances of affect-
ing the composition of the managing board becomes as slim as his Amer-
ican counterpart's.
B. INTERESTED DIRECTOR PROVISIONS
American corporation statutes give directors extensive authority to fix
their own compensation, 4 ' to borrow money from the corporation,"' and
to engage in contracts with the company from which they may benefit
substantially.2 3 The standard applied to such conduct is whether or not
the transaction was "fair" to the corporation or was in bad faith.244
Under the Delaware Code, a contract between a director and the com-
pany is valid if the material facts as to the interest are disclosed and
the contract is ratified by a majority of the disinterested directors;
25
however, the interested party may be included in establishing a quo-
rum. 46 The contract is also valid if ratified by a majority of shareholders
where the material facts are known.247 Nevertheless, the interested direc-
tor generally has the burden of proof with respect to the fairness of the
transaction.
28
The European statutes are somewhat stricter. In the British company,
the shareholders' meeting determines the compensation to be paid
directors.2 9 Furthermore, the company may not make loans to directors
except where the company is a subsidiary and the director its holding
company or where the director has incurred expenses for the benefit of
the company, in which case the loan must be repaid within six
months.no A director or his firm may contract with the company, how-
ever, and retain profits made if such contracts are permitted by the
articles, if the director has disclosed all material facts regarding the
transaction, and if the company ratifies the contract at a general meet-
ing.SC§
241. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (1974).
242. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (1974).
243. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974).
244. Although a very few jurisdictions find such contracts voidable irrespective of fair-
ness, "in a majority of states . . . a transaction involving an interested director is now
voidable only if unfair . . . or if the directors acted in bad faith." G. HORNSTEIN, 1
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 439 (1959).
245. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (1974).
246. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(b) (1974).
247. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (1974).
248. CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 566. Where the transaction is fair and the interested
director does not participate in the voting, the contract, in most jurisdictions, "cannot,
even in the absence of ratification, be avoided." Id. at 565.
249. Companies Clauses Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 91.
250. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 190.
251. 6 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 75, at 302-03.
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French law provides for payment of the directorate to be established
in the instrument of appointment for each director.252 For members of
the administrative board or the supervisory board, however, remunera-
tion is limited strictly to attendance fees specified by the shareholders'
meeting and compensation for special tasks.ns The law prohibits abso-
lutely any loans by the company to members of the managing board,
supervisory board or administrative board, their spouses, ascendants
and descendants, and any representatives of legal entities with board
positions.2 4 However, agreements between board members and the com-
pany are valid as long as the supervisory board or the administrative
board authorizes them,ns but the auditors' report must specify the ma-
terial facts of any such agreement.O
The German law and the proposed Fifth Directive are substantially
similar in their requirements. Members of the supervisory board and the
management board may not determine their own compensation., In
addition, all contracts between members of the supervisory or manage-
ment boards and the company must be authorized by the supervisory
board.2s Though the Directive is silent as to loans, the German Act
provides that the supervisory board must ratify any extension of credit
to a board member or his family member. 219 Under this act, strict control
is placed on the types of transactions permissible, and the resolution
must disclose the amount of principal and interest rate involved.2 10
The Sanders Draft allows substantial freedom in the determination
of compensation to the supervisory board members,'2 ' but it strictly
prevents loans to any members of the supervisory or management
boards, their ascendants or descendants.2 2 Agreements in which the
252. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 123.
253. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Arts. 107, 108, 140, 141.
254. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Arts. 106, 148.
255. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Arts. 103, 143. These sections apply as
well to agreements between the company and an enterprise whose directorate or supervi-
sory board includes a member of the management or supervisory board of the company.
256. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 103.
257. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, §§ 87, 113; Fifth Directive, Art. 8, 1 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 1401H (1974).
258. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 114; Fifth Directive, Art. 10, 1 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 1401K (1974). The latter requires authorization at least from the supervisory board,
indicating that such agreements may require ratification by the general meeting
(emphasis added).
259. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 115 (1), (2).
260. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 115(1).
261. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-2-7(1). Remuneration of supervisory board
members may be established in the articles of incorporation or determined at the share-
holders' meeting.
262. Id. Art. IV-1-8-(3); Art. IV-2-7(2).
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company and members of either board are directly or indirectly inter-
ested require approval of the supervisory board,63 and an interested
supervisory board member may not participate in the vote.264
While the British law in all these respects gives the shareholder more
protection than any other, the American corporation law affords the
least. Though shareholder determination of director remuneration and
ratification of interested director contracts may present practical diffi-
culties in some cases, it would certainly have an inhibiting effect on
ethically questionable transactions. Where directors may ratify each
other's contracts or loans, the temptation of abuse is strong. In Europe,
where such transactions must be disclosed only after they have taken
place, and where no Rule 10b-5 remedy or derivative action is available,
shareholder ratification is the best guarantee of protection. For the
small company, the British rule is preferable to civil liability since ratifi-
cation of contracts would not be impractical and it is cheaper than
litigation. With the European emphasis on company expansion, how-
ever, stronger sanctions are needed to prevent abuse in this area. Share-
holder remedies should be strengthened through laws analogous to
American securities regulations. Such a provision should be included in
the Fifth Directive.
C. STATUTORY STANDARD OF CARE
At common law, courts were reluctant to interfere with the business
judgment of company directors: "It is not the business of the courts to
manage the affairs of the company. That is for the shareholders and the
directors." '265 Liability has been imposed, however, where directors have
committed palpable fraud, waste of company assets, or actual or legal
overreaching. 266 Generally, however, American courts have imposed Iia-
263. Id. Art. IV-2-1(2); Art. IV-2-7(3).
264. Id.
265. Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros. & Co. [1927] 2 K.B. 9, 23, as cited in Wedderburn,
Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 1957 CAMB. L.J. 194 (1957).
American courts have adopted this view: "The rule is well settled that '[c]ourts are
reluctant to interfere in the internal management of a corporation since that is a matter
for the discretion and judgment of the directors and stockholders. . . .'" Selheimer v.
Manganese Corporation of America, 423 Pa. 563, 581, 224 A.2d 634, 644 (1966). See also
Adkins and Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20 Bus. LAW.
817 (1965).
266. Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684 (1872) established that
. ..directors are personally responsible to the stockholders for any losses result-
ing from fraud, embezzlement or willful misconduct or breach of trust for their
own benefit and not for the benefit of the stockholders, for gross inattention and
negligence by which such fraud or misconduct has been perpetrated. . ..
Id. at 24, 10 Am. Rep. at 693.
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bility sparingly; the "reasonable man standard" has been the judicial
norm and liability is usually restricted to cases where the director's
wrong is egregious. ' All but one of the ten states which have statutory
provisions for the standard of care have adopted this negligence stand-
ard.268 Only Pennsylvania requires that a director, standing in a fidu-
ciary relationship to the corporation, must discharge his duties "with
that diligence, care, and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exer-
cise under similar circumstances in their personal business affairs." '
The New York statute, setting out the "ordinarily prudent man" stand-
ard, also provides that directors shall be justified in relying on the
accuracy of the financial statement as presented by the corporation
president or officer having charge of the corporate books. 0
Fortunately, minority shareholders are not solely dependent on judi-
cial and statutory protection. The federal securities laws relating to the
purchase and sale of stock have also been a fertile source of director
liability. Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,2I directors may
be liable for any misstatement or omission in a securities registration
statement.272 Civil liability may also be incurred under Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 3 for including false and misleading
statements in proxiesm4 or omitting material statements therefrom.2 17
Under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act,26 a director is penalized for engag-
ing in "short-swing" trading; that is, he must return to the company any
profits realized from the buying and selling of company stock within a
six-month period.2 77 In recent years, however, the most significant source
of director liability has been SEC Rule 10b-5, 2 78 which makes unlawful
any fraudulent action in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities market. 71
267. CARY, CASES, supra note 59, at 543-45. See Dyson, The Director's Liability for
Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 373-75 (1964).
268. Adkins and Janis, supra note 265, at 817-18.
269. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1967).
270. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963). See Adkins and Janis, supra note
265, at 829.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1971).
272. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
273. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(1971).
274. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964).
275. Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
276. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1971).
277. B.T. Babbitt, Inc., v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964); Adler v. Klawans, 267
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
278. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
279. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976,
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British case law has developed standards of care which are very simi-
lar to the Pennsylvania requirements in that a director is liable for
negligence if he fails to exercise such care as a reasonable man might
exercise in similar circumstances on his own behalf.8 0 Directors may act
in reliance on the officers of the company whom they are entitled to
trust,2s' and they are not required to know the contents of the company's
books. 2s2 Directors are not held for "mere imprudence in errors of judg-
ment." 21 Yet while a director is not liable for untrue representations in
the balance sheets if he honestly believed them to be true,24 he is held
liable for material misrepresentation of fact in the company prospec-
tus.2 1 Thus, although comparable to the American statutes and judicial
holdings, the British liability provisions are weaker than the SEC laws.
The major comparative weakness of British law is in available reme-
dies. Generally only the company may bring an action against a direc-
tor.m6 An individual shareholder, under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 2 7
may not bring a representative suit "if the action complained of is one
which could be effectively remedied by a vote of a simple majority at a
general meeting."' 5 Shareholder suits against corporate directors for
negligence are not recognized.29 The Companies Act of 1948 did afford
some relief in Section 210, which gives the court a right to intervene on
behalf of "oppressed" minority shareholders and prescribe whatever
remedies it deems necessary. 20 The court may provide relief, however,
reh. denied, 404 U.S. 1064, (1969); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). See also articles listed in R. JENNINGS
AND H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1131-32 (1972).
280. Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co., Ltd., [1925] 1 Ch. 407, [1924] All E.R.
485 (C.A.); Merchants' Fire Office v. Armstrong, 17 T.L.R. 709 (C.A. 1901).
281. Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co., Ltd., id.; Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamber-
lain, [1918] 1 Ch. 266, (C.A.).
282. Hallmark's Case, 9 Ch. D. 329 (C.A. 1878); Dovey v. Cory, [1901] A.C. 477 (H.L.).
283. 6 HALSBURY'S LAws, supra note 75, at 310. See Re New Mashonaland Exploration
Co., [1898] 3 Ch. 577; Turquand v. Marshall, 4 Ch. App. 376 (1869).
284. Dovey v. Cory, [1901] A.C. 477 (H.L.).
285. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 38, 46. A director may not be liable for
misstatements of a co-director in a prospectus unless he has expressly authorized or tacitly
permitted its issue. Cargill v. Bower, 10 Ch. D. 502 (1878).
286. 6 HALSBURY'S LAws, supra note 75, at 306-07.
287. [1843] 2 Hare 461.
288. Gower, supra note 61, at 1385.
289. Hornstein, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit in the United States, 1967 J. Bus.
L. 282, 285.
290. The shareholder may bring the action on his'own behalf, but he has the burden of
establishing that the behavior complained of is oppressive. Inefficient or careless behavior
is not enough; one must show actions establishing a lack of probity or fair dealing, de-
signed to gain an unfair advantage over the shareholder. See Re Five Minute Car Wash
Service, Ltd., [1966] 1 All E.R. 242.
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only where the facts of the case would otherwise dictate that the com-
pany should be wound up.2 1 Thus far the provision has afforded little
relief because the courts have interpreted it strictly.22 The Jenkins Re-
port219 in 1962 recommended an easing of the requirement that the facts
justify winding up. Instead of requiring the shareholder to prove a pat-
tern of oppressive counduct, the Report indicated that isolated instan-
ces should be sufficient to maintain proceedings. 94 Although the courts
have not embraced this liberal recommendation, Gower states that Sec-
tion 210 has nevertheless had a strong in terrorem effect.2 19 Regardless,
the section should be strengthened so that it will provide actual relief
without undue burdens on the shareholder. In conjunction with more
forceful disclosure requirements, it could provide significant protection.
The German statutory requirements regarding the management and
supervisory board members' duty of care are much stricter than the
American and British requirements of directors. A German board mem-
ber must act "with the care of a diligent and prudent executive, 2  and
where the board member's performance is in question, he has the burden
of proof. 9 Although if the board member acts pursuant to a valid share-
holders' resolution no liability attaches,"' authorization by the supervi-
sory board does not preclude liability. 99 Specifically, the statute enu-
merates repayment of capital contributions to shareholders, issuance of
share certificates before capital is paid in, and distribution of company
assets as actions which may entail liability2°
Although the statute on its face appears to give the shareholder pro-
291. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210(2)(b).
292. See Meyer v. Scottish Textile and Mfg. Co., [1954] Scots L.T.R. 273 (1st Div.);
Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., [1952] Sess. Cas. 49 (Scot. 1st Div. 1951). The court may
find cause to wind up the company, yet refuse relief under this section. Re Lundie Bros.,
Ltd., [1965] All E.R. 692. Cf. Re Bellador Silk, Ltd., [1965] All E.R. 667. See generally
Gower, supra note 61, at 1387; Hornstein, supra note 289, at 288-89; Bretten, Alteration
of Articles and Protection of Minorities, 1970 J. Bus. L. 185, 195 (1970).
293. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, JENKINS REPORT, CMD. No. 1749 (1962).
294. Hornstein, supra note 289, at 288-89; Rajak, The Oppression of Minority
Shareholders, 35 MOD. L. REV. 156, 167 (1972).
295. Gower, supra note 61, at 1387; But cf. Rajak, supra note 294, at 168. Rajak con-
tends that:
• * * while proof to substantiate or refute [the in terrorem effect of § 210] is
impossible to obtain, it is submitted that a sword which has been severely blunted
in battle is unlikely to be a trustworthy weapon off the battle-field.
Id.
296. AktG, [19651 BGBI.I 1089, §§ 93, 116.
297. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 93(2).
298. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 93(4).
299. AktG, [19651 BGBI.I 1089, § 93(2).
300. AktG, [19651 BGBI.I 1089, § 93(3).
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tection against board member incompetence, the remedial provisions
and judicial interpretation are barriers to shareholder claims. No indi-
vidual shareholder or derivative action exists20 ' Instead, any action
against managing or supervisory board members must originate in the
shareholders' meeting or at the behest of holders of 10 percent of the
capital stock who have held such stock for three months or more.1 2 Even
if a claimant brings suit within six months of the shareholders' meeting
as required, the court is unlikely to impose liability.0 3 Though the Ger-
man standard of care is stated much more strongly than the American
standard, its enforcement is relatively weak. Board members are rarely
held liable to the corporation because of a prevalent judicial feeling that
they must be free to take risks. Except for violation of the specific
statutory provisions enumerated above, the practical result is very simi-




The French statute, like most American state statutes, is silent as to
the duty of care to be imposed on management and supervisory board
members. The only guidelines are provided in sections which bind the
members to secrecy on confidential company matters35 and which pro-
vide that they may be held liable for violation of statutes or by-laws or
for "faults committed in their management. '30 6 Given the tendency of
German judges to refrain from imposing liability in the face of a strict
statute, the notably weak French enactment in comparison appears to
open wide the door to management abuse. A relatively stronger damage
section may, however, partially compensate for this weakness. While the
statute itself authorizes a derivative suit by shareholders either individ-
ually or as a class, 37 the clause's implementing decree limits this right
301. See Eckert, Shareholder and Management: A Comparative View on Some Corpo-
rate Problems in the United States and Germany, 46 IOWA L. REv. 12, 72-83; Vagts, supra
note 17, at 58-60.
302. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 147(2). The company itself must be a party to any
suit against members of the management or supervisory boards. Generally the supervisory
board represents the company, but agents may be designated by the general meeting or
the court to bring the action where there is distrust of the supervisory board. Thus, while
the corporation is an indispensable party to litigation in Germany and the United States,
there is a crucial difference in that
the participation of the [German Company] is absolutely necessary in order to
have a plaintiff at all, whereas the American corporation is joined [in a derivative
action] in order to make binding upon it the results of the litigation.
Eckert, supra note 301, at 77.
303. Steefel and von Falkenhausen, supra note 17, at 532.
304. Id.
305. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 149.
306. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Arts. 244, 249, 250.
307. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 245.
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by stipulating that any individual bringing suit must represent one-
twentieth of the stated capital holdings and must bear all expenses."'
Because of the substantial burden of expenses in derivative suits, the
statute is likely to give little relief, and minority shareholders remain
essentially defenseless against corporate mismanagement.
With respect to the issue of the standard of care, the European Com-
pany Statute is substantially similar to the German act. Management
board members must act with the care of conscientious administrators"°
and must be bound to secrecy on confidential company matters.3 t0 The
Act also provides that members shall be jointly and severally liable for
violations of the statute, of the company by-laws, or for faults commit-
ted in their management".3 1 Any managing board member who can show
specific lack of liability and prove he notified the supervisory board in
writing of the act or failure to act as soon as he became aware of it may
be absolved, 3 1 but authorization from the supervisory board does not
absolve the management board of liability.
313
The shareholder's remedy for mismanagement is a suit for damages
brought by the supervisory board against one or all members of the
management board3t4 or a derivative suit brought by holders of five




Though this standard is essentially the same as that stipulated in the
French statute, the size of the European Company makes satisfaction
of the capital holding requirement very difficult. While the Statute is
more favorable to the shareholder than the French statute in awarding
costs to the plaintiffs at the expense of the company, 3 1 the plaintiffs are
personally liable for the company's costs if the suit is dismissed. If the
action was malicious, the company may also sue for damages.3 , The
combined factors of the capital holding requirement and liability for
expenses in case of dismissal will be effective barriers to shareholder
action. To offer more adequate protection, the Statute should provide
for individual shareholder action. The threat of liability for damages
and the expense of bringing an action would be sufficient deterrents to
strike suits.
308. Decree No. 67-236 of March 23, 1967, J.O. of March 24, 1967, Art. 200.
309. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-1-9(1).
310. Id. Art. IV-1-9(2).
311. Id. Art. IV-1-10(1).
312. Id. Art. IV-1-10(2).
313. Id. Art. IV-1-10(3).
314. Id. Art. IV-1-11(1).
315. Id. Art. IV-1-11(2).
316. Id. Art. IV-1-11(3).
317. Id. Art. IV-1-11(4).
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On the issue of the standard of care, the Fifth Directive offers nothing
more than the lowest common denominator. Article 14 provides only
that the company has an action for damages against the members of the
management and supervisory boards for breaches of law or company
statutes or "other wrongful acts" committed by board members in fur-
therance of their duties.318 A board member may exonerate himself by
showing no fault on his part but, as in the German Act, authorization
of the supervisory board is no defense to management board liability.319
While the company may bring an action on the resolution of a simple
majority of its members, one or more shareholders representing five
percent or more of the capital or shares valued at 100,000 u.a. may also
commence an action.32 0 The statute does not provide for allocation of
expenses. Therefore, while the Fifth Directive similarly suffers from the
capital holding limitation on shareholder suits, it does not incorporate
expense reimbursement provisions which adequately discourage frivo-
lous or malicious actions.
Thus, no European company law or proposed law provides protection
for the shareholder equal to that established under the American securi-
ties laws and derivative action. As the European population increases
its share holdings, greater demand for more effective relief from man-
agement incompetence or abuse is likely to lead to increased access to
the courts for the individual shareholder. This trend is already apparent
in Great Britain, which has been slightly ahead of the continent in
encouraging increased individual ownership of shares.2 ' The American
provisions for civil liability of officers and directors in this area appear
to provide an effective model for European laws.
SUMMARY
The European company laws rely heavily on statutory disclosure pro-
visions to prevent improper behavior on the part of directors. Conse-
quently, contracts with the company and loans from it, where permit-
ted, must be approved by the shareholders or the supervisory board. In
America the corporation statutes do not regulate strictly and thus con-
tain much potential for abuse; but in a company whose shares are regis-
tered under the securities laws, any fraudulent behavior connected with
the sale or purchase of shares may result in significant civil liability.
318. Fifth Directive, Art. 14, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1226 (1974).
319. Art. 14(2), (4), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1401P (1974). Art. 14(5) does give more
protection than the German Act in that authorization by the general meeting does not
exempt board members from civil liability. Cf. AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089, § 93(4).
320. Arts. 15, 16, 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 1226 (1974).
321. THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 1966, at 52.
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Some commentators have suggested that the European director has a
higher sense of honor or loyalty than his American counterpart, and that
the restraining statutes are adequate protection for the shareholder.2 2
Again, company size and the extent of distribution of shares may be
significant factors in control over behavior of the directors; the two-tier
form also may play a role. It is likely that as corporations grow the
present statutes will become less adequate, necessitating a more effec-
tive remedy for the individual shareholder, such as the derivative suit.
IV
SHAREHOLDERS AND THE ACCOUNTANTS
In most American corporations, company auditors are seen merely as
a division of the management arm. A disagreement between manage-
ment and the auditors may be cause for replacement of the auditors and
the shareholders may not interfere in the decision."' Only Massachu-
setts requires that the shareholders' meeting approve the directors'
choice of an auditor;" 4 although companies regulated under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 194021 must also submit proposed auditors for
shareholder ratification. Of 7,000 companies filing proxy statements
with the SEC in 1973, 3,121 asked for shareholder approval of auditors
3 2
but 1.5 million unlisted and unregistered companies, of which more than
100,000 have assets over $1,000,000 are under no duty to file auditors'
reports or to have their accounts certified by Certified Public Account-
ants.3 27 For the protection of shareholders in these companies, state
corporation codes should adopt independent auditor provisions similar
to those found in the statutes of the countries under consideration.
In Britain, each annual shareholders' meeting appoints auditors to
serve until the next meeting. The auditors are reappointed unless they
are not qualified for reappointment or have given notice of unwillingness
322. See Eckert, supra note 301, at 37-44.
323. Hawes, Stockholder Appointment of Independent Auditors: A Proposal, 74 COLUM.
L. REv. 1 (1974).
324. MAss. ANN. LAws, c. 156B, § 111 (1970).
325. 15 U.S.C. § 80a et seq. (1971).
326. Hawes, supra note 323, at 1.
327. Conard, An Overview of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH. L. Rav. 623, 646-48
(1970). Conard points out, significantly, that auditors who are fired because of disagree-
ments with management have no duty to complain to the shareholders. Recent amend-
ments to § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require companies to file a report if
the auditor certifying their most recent report has been changed; the company must
inform the Commission of any disagreements occurring within the previous eighteen
months and the auditor may defend his position in a letter to the SEC. Hawes, supra note
323, at 16.
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to serve, or unless the company passes a resolution appointing another
auditor or expressly providing for the termination of the present one.3
The effectiveness of these provisions has been illustrated by a few noted
cases in recent years wherein management proposals to appoint new
auditors have been defeated or withdrawn prior to a vote in circum-
stances where auditor disagreement with management policies was
apparent. Where auditor disapproval of management policies is appar-
ent, shareholders abandon their rubber-stamp ratification of manage-
ment policies.329 Presumably this would be the case if a similar situation
faced an American corporation.
The French and German statutes are more restrictive than the British
concerning qualifications of auditors. Whereas in Britain the auditor is
disqualified if he is not a member of a recognized body of accountants
or is an officer or servant of the company, employee or partner of such
person, the continental auditor must meet certification requirements
and may not have been an officer or employee for three years previous
to his appointment. 30 Also disqualified in France are corporate foun-
ders, contributors of assets of any kind, beneficiaries of special prefer-
ence, board members, and any relatives up to the fourth degree of such
persons, as well as board members and their relatives of corporations
owning 10 percent or more of the principal company.3' French share-
holders may defeat the appointment if holders of 10 percent or more of
the stated capital object in court to such appointment and the court
sustains their objection.3
2
Where the auditors find irregularities in a corporation's accounts,
they must call attention to them at the next shareholders' meeting.
They are also obliged to inform the State Prosecutor of any offenses of
which they have knowledge. Although the auditors may not be dis-
missed without a hearing either before the shareholders or before state
prosecutorial or judicial authorities, they may be held liable for failure
to disclose any such irregularities in their report to the shareholders.M
The German statute provides that where the auditors disagree with
company management on the interpretation of the financial statement
and the business report, either party may apply to the district court for
328. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 160.
329. Hawes, supra note 323, at 9.
330. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 220; AktG, [1965] BGB1.I 1089,
§ 164.
331. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 220.
332. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 225.
333. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 233.
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a hearing.? The court's decision is appealable only at its discretion . 35
The Fifth Directive includes the French and German requirements of
disaffiliation from the corporation for three years prior to appointment
and the stipulation that any auditor must be certified or approved by a
judicial or administrative authority.36 Furthermore, a shareholder or
members of the supervisory or management boards may apply to the
court within two weeks to cancel the appointment of any auditor im-
properly delegated. 317 While no specific provision is made for recourse in
case of disagreement, the Directive states that the auditors have a duty
to prepare a report stating whether or not the company has complied
with the national law and company statutes and whether or not the
auditors have observed any serious danger to the company's financial
well-being. It also provides that except where "proper grounds" exist,
the auditors may not be dismissed by the general meeting before the end
of their terms.33 Contrary to the British33 and German3 10 provisions for
annual appointment of auditors, the Fifth Directive follows the French
law3" ' and specifies a term of years.' 2 The inclusion of a provision, such
as contained in the British or German acts, that any disagreement be-
tween auditors and management should be arbitrated by either the
shareholders or a court would clearly strengthen the Directive.
The Sanders Draft provides that shareholders' meetings shall elect
annual auditors as specified under national law. 3 Though the Draft
grants the auditors broad powers to inspect the company records and
requires a report stating any grounds for suspecting overstatement or
understatement of items in the balance sheet, 31' the Draft fails to specify
any remedy in case of disagreement with management. It provides only
that holders of five percent of the capital may bring suit in the Court of
Justice if they believe that the annual report of the company does not
comply with the statutes.3 5 The auditors under this statute appear to
have far less protection from management coercion than do company
auditors under national laws. Given the nature of the enterprise and the
334. AktG, [1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 169(1).
335. AktG, [19651 BGB1.I 1089, § 169(2).
336. Fifth Directive, Art. 54-55, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. % 1235 (1974).
337. Fifth Directive, Art. 55, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1235 (1974).
338. Fifth Directive, Art. 55, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1235 (1974).
339. Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 159.
340. AktG, (1965] BGBI.I 1089, § 163.
341. Law of July 24, 1966, J.O. of July 26, 1966, Art. 224.
342. Fifth Directive, Art. 56, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1235 (1974).
343. Sanders Draft, supra note 24, Art. IV-4-1.
344. Id. Art. VI-4-2.
345. Id. Art. VI-4-5.
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sophistication of the anticipated European Company management, this
omission is surprising. Careful attention should be given to this part of
the Draft before it is enacted. The Draft does include a provision for the
appointment of special auditors where facts giving rise to the suspicion
of gross breach of duty exist-but this requires too much. The workabil-
ity of the British, French and German statutes indicates that a provision
modeled after one of the national laws should be included in the Draft.
CONCLUSION
The comparative analysis has revealed significant differences between
American corporation law, the existing laws of France, Great Britain
and Germany, and the proposed European Company Statute and Fifth
Directive. Some of these distinctions can be explained primarily by the
number, size and diversity of corporations. American securities law is
far more sophisticated than European law because such a high percen-
tage of the population owns shares and because many of the corpora-
tions issuing securities are so large and diversified that internal share-
holder control is impossible. The proxy system has become highly devel-
oped in this country because share ownership is not localized and meet-
ing attendance is impossible for the bulk of stockholders.
A highly significant distinction is in the concept of the shareholders'
meeting itself. The European statutes uniformly speak of three corpo-
rate organs-the management board, the supervisory board, and the
company meeting. The meeting has definite and specified functions.
3 6
As evidenced, the shareholders establish policy in authorizing divi-
dends, approving capital increases and reductions, and appointing audi-
tors, functions which are left to the directors in America. The "group"
concept applies to all functions of the meeting.347 Generally an individ-
ual shareholder may never act on his own; a five or ten percent minority
is required for resolutions to be placed on the agenda, for the request of
a special meeting, or for challenges to qualifications of board members
and directors.
A result of this "group approach" is the comparative rigidity of the
corporation laws. The American laws can afford flexibility because they
are supported by the securities laws and because an aggrieved share-
holder may individually bring a suit against a director or officer on
behalf of the corporation. The injury to the shareholder need not be
direct, as long as the company is injured. The German shareholder, in
contrast, does not have the benefit of the derivative action and may sue
346. See notes 112-16 supra and accompanying text.
347. See Eckert, supra note 301, at 70.
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in tort only when he is directly injured. The difficulty of obtaining relief
after the fact in Europe has thus led to institution of statutory prior
restraint. The standard of responsibility for corporate directors is an
objective one. Incompetence attributable to lack of ability or lack of
fitness for the job affords no valid excuse. The applied standard becomes
a mechanical test of whether or not a statute has been breached." '
The proposed statutes for company law in the EEC draw heavily from
the German and French laws, perpetuating this mechanical approach.
As corporations in those countries take advantage of new transnational
merger and consolidation patterns and increase in size, the old pattern
will become less satisfactory and more flexibility will be demanded.
British law offers some of this flexibility, but the British statutes have
not been incorporated into the proposed company law. It is to be hoped
as the Fifth Directive and the European Company Statute progress
toward passage by the EEC Council and Commission they will be
amended to reflect the more flexible standards of the British and Ameri-
can laws.
348. Id. at 69.
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